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LOCKING IN CAPITAL: WHAT CORPORATE LAW ACHIEVED
FOR BUSINESS ORGANIZERS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Margaret M. Blair
This Article argues that corporate status became popular in the nineteenth century
as a way to organize production because of the unique manner in which incorpora-
tion permitted organizers to lock in financial capital. Unlike participants in a
partnership, shareholders in an incorporated enterprise could not extract capital from
the firm without explicit approval of a board of directors charged with representing the
interests of the incorporated entity, even when that interest might sometimes conflict
with the interests of individual shareholders. While this ability to lock in capital has
occasionally led to abuses, the ability to commit capital generally helped promote and
protect the interests of shareholders as a group by making it possible for the entity to
invest in long-term, highly specific investments. It also helped protect a wide range of
enterprise participants who made specialized investments in reliance on the continued
existence and financial viability of the corporation.
The ability to lock in capital grew out of the fact that a corporate charter created
a separate legal entity, whose existence and governance were separate from any of its
participants. Although the idea that the law creates a separate legal "person" when a
corporation is formed has been played down in the legal scholarship of the last two
decades in favor of the view that a corporation is simply a "nexus" through which
natural persons interact, recent legal scholarship has begun to reconsider the importance
of entity status. Entity status under the law, and the associated separation of govern-
ance from contribution of financial capital through the formation of a corporation,
allowed corporate participants to do something more than engage in a series of business
transactions, or relationships, or even projects. It made it possible to build lasting
institutions. Investments could be made in long-lived and specialized physical assets,
in information and control systems, in specialized knowledge and routines, and in
reputation and relationships, all of which could be sustained even as individual
participants in the enterprise came and went. And these business institutions, in
turn, could accomplish more toward the improvement of the wealth and standard of
* Sloan Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Research on this Article has
been supported by the Georgetown-Sloan Project on Business Institutions. I would like to thank Jeff
Bauman, Dan Ernst, Bill Klein, Miu Gulati, Bill Bratton, Michael Diamond, Jill Fisch, Kenneth Rosen,
Gordon Smith, Henry Hansmann, Richard Chused, and Roger Conner, and participants at workshops
at Vanderbilt Law School, Fordham Law School, and Georgetown University Law Center, for advice
and feedback on early drafts of this Article. Colleen Dunlavy provided me with copies of a few early
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HeinOnline  -- 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387 2003-2004
388 51 UCLA LAW REVIEW 387 (2003)
living of their participants in the long run than the same individuals could by holding
separate property clairns on business assets and engaging in a series of separate contracts
with each other.
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INTRODUCTION
The phrase "lock-in," when used in the context of corporate law, generally
has a negative meaning, suggesting the dreaded fate of a minority shareholder
in a closely held corporation who cannot sell her shares (perhaps because there
are restrictions on stock sales, or perhaps because there is just no market for such
shares), and cannot compel the corporation to pay out any of its income or assets
to shareholders.' Similarly, the phrase "separation of ownership from control"
refers to a feature of publicly traded corporations that has been widely regarded
by legal scholars and economists for the last few decades as the source of one of
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 139 (8th ed. 2002) ("Under partnership law, it is easy for
a partner to terminate his or her involvement in the firm .... Corporate law just creates the opposite prob-
lem (which is sometimes referred to as 'lock-in')."). See 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.02 (3d ed. 2003). The authors note:
[A] shareholder in a close corporation does not have the exit option available to a shareholder
in a publicly held corporation, who can sell shares in a securities market if dissatisfied with the
way the corporation is being operated. Shares in a close corporation, particularly less than a
controlling interest, cannot be easily sold.
Id. For a classic discussion of the "lock-in" problem, see also J. A. C. Hetherington & Michael P.
Dooley, lliquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Prob-
lem, 63 VA. L. REv. (1977).
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the most serious infirmities of the corporate form.2 But while restrictions on
withdrawing capital from corporations and the control of corporations by indi-
viduals who are not major shareholders can both be abused, I argue in this
Article that it was precisely these features of corporations that made the corpo-
rate form so useful in the development of modem industrial economies. I
develop that argument by exploring why U.S. business entrepreneurs in the
nineteenth century began seeking out and using the corporate form to organize
their businesses.
Although the legal rles that form the basis of contemporary corporations
had their basis in earlier law, the corporate form that we are familiar with in the
United States today emerged over the course of the nineteenth century, and
during that one century, corporations became the dominant way to organize
large-scale businesses.' Today corporations are among the most influential
forces in economic activity worldwide.
Why did the corporate form become the preferred way to organize large-
scale business when it did? And what did the adoption of a corporate form
accomplish for the organizers of business that could not have been accomplished
through other nineteenth century legal forms? Business historians have hypothe-
sized three possible explanations: the ability to amass large amounts of capital,
limited liability, and the centralization of control.4 While these abilities were
2. An extensive literature questions the efficiency of corporations in which the role of "owner" is
separated from "control." See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 1, at 173 ("[The separation of ownership
and control ... has remained the point of departure for most modem commentary about the publicly held
corporation. To the extent one believes that management is free from constraints, it is easy to believe that
the interests of shareholders are not being well served."). See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE
LAW (Roberta Romano ed., 1993); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520 (1990); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1403 (1985); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Finn, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301
(1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Finn: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Henry 0. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and
the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
3. According to one survey, by the year 1800 only 335 charters had been issued in the United
States for business corporations--88 percent of which had been issued after 1790. See 2 JOSEPH
STANCLIFFE DAVIS, Eighteenth Century Business Corporations in the United States, in ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 3, 24 tbl.I (1917). By 1890, there were nearly 500,000
business corporations. See Dow VOTAW, MODERN CORPORATIONS 24 (1965). By 1904, the total par
value of manufacturing stocks and bonds listed on the major exchanges for public trading was $6.8
billion, more than half the book value of all manufacturing capital as measured in the 1904 census. See
WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN
AMERICA 5 (1997) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 (1975)).
4. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 24 (1970) ("The corporation met the need to develop
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important in many situations, it was a fourth factor that turned out to be the
critical advantage of the corporate form: the ability to commit capital, once
amassed, for extended periods of time-for decades and even centuries. How
exactly does organizing a business through a corporation facilitate these things,
and why were they important?
The Article suggests that the chartering of a corporation legally transformed
the business enterprise in ways that would have been impossible or extremely
difficult to achieve through individual proprietorship, partnership, or other forms
of contract law-at least as these forms were understood by the law in the early
nineteenth century. The first way was that incorporation gave the enterprise
"entity" status under the law,' and the second was that incorporation required
governance rules that legally separated business decisionmaking from contribu-
tions of financial capital.6
organization as a major economic asset by legitimating a combination of strong central direction and
limited commitments [meaning limited liability]"). "[Tlhe corporate form encouraged the muster or
retention of resources by offering investors an assured frame of limited commitments .. " Id. at 26; see
also RONALD E. SEAvOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION 1784-1855, at
50 (1982) (noting that incorporation in early nineteenth century New York was advantageous because
it "offered the protection of limited liability for investors in speculative enterprises"). "Incorporation
would... facilitate the ownership of property and the sharing of profits among a larger number of per-
sons [to] help mobilize capital." Id. at 63. 'The only advantages of an incorporation under the statute
over partnerships... consist in a capacity to manage the affairs of the institution by a few... agents, and
by an exoneration from any responsibility beyond the amount of the individual subscriptions." Id. at 70
(quoting Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 456, 474 (N.Y. 1822) (Spencer, C.J.)); SHAW LIVERMORE, EARLY
AMERICAN LAND COMPANIES: THEIR INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT 2 n.2. (Octagon
Books 1968) (1939) (noting that business leaders in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were
looking for an organizational vehicle in which outsiders could passively invest). "Perpetuity, concentration
of managerial powers in the right hands, and free transferability of interest are the essential means to
that end." LIVERMORE, supra, at 2 n.2.
5. Much legal scholarship in the last two decades has dismissed the importance of the legal con-
vention that defines corporations as legal "persons" in favor of a view that a corporation is a nexus through
which natural persons interact with each other. See, for example, EASTERBROOK & FISCHE, supra note 2,
which summarized prior research and set a baseline for future research on the "nexus of contracts" view
of corporations. However, a number of corporate scholars have lately been revisiting the importance of
corporate personhood and entity status. See, e.g., William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A
Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 (2002) (defining and discussing the
entity model of corporations); Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Finn, in
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 86 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999)
(noting that certain kinds of multilateral and multidimensional relationships and agreements among
individuals may be facilitated by giving separate entity status to the corporation). In an especially
important article on the role of entity status, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman discuss how
entity status is used to partition assets among potential claimants. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000). See the discussion infra notes 7-14
and accompanying text. The history of the development of entity status in the law of business
organizations is explored in Henry Hansmann et al., Legal Entities, Asset Partitioning, and the
Evolution of Organizations (Feb. 2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with UCLA Law Review).
6. Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen offer an economic theory about the benefits of separation,
noting that separation allowed firm participants to specialize in either risk taking or decisionmaking. See
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Entity status for incorporated businesses meant that a chartered corporation
was recognized as a distinct legal entity, separate from any of its investors or
managers, for purposes of buying, selling, or holding property, of making con-
tracts, and of suing and being sued. As Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman
have discussed at length in their recent Yale Law Review article,7 the creation of
a separate legal entity allows business organizers to partition the assets used in
the business. Partitioning has two aspects: Individual participants in the
business are not held personally responsible for the debts or liabilities of the
business (this aspect is commonly referred to as "limited liability" in the context
of business corporations'), and participants and third parties are assured that the
pool of assets used in the business will be available to meet the needs of the busi-
ness first (such as, to pay the claims of the business's creditors) before these assets
can be distributed to shareholders.9
Some legal scholars have stressed the important role played by limited
liability in allowing business corporations to attract capital in the form of mod-
est investments by many small investors.'l Without minimizing this important
Fama & Jensen, supra note 2, at 301. Other scholars, especially those coming out of the law and economics
tradition, have commonly referred to this effect as "separation of ownership from control." Oliver Hart's
important work on property rights as a gap filler in incomplete contracts, however, defines "ownership"
as the residual right of control. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Verical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691,693-94 (1986) ("[W~e do not
distinguish between ownership and control and virtually define ownership as the power to exercise
control."); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POE. ECON. 1119,
1120 (1990) ("[W~e identify a firm with the assets it possesses and take the position that ownership
confers residual rights of control over the firm's assets."). By this definition, "ownership" cannot be sepa-
rated from "control." To avoid confusion about ideas important in this Article, therefore, I choose not to
use the words "owner" or "ownership" to describe the role played by shareholders in business corporations.
7. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 393.
8. Hansmann and Kraakman use the phrase "defensive asset partitioning" to describe this type
of partitioning in more general contexts. Id. at 394.
9. In the more general context of the key elements of entity status under the law, this form of asset
partitioning is referred to as "affirmative asset partitioning" (AAP). Id. at 393; Hansmann et al., supra
note 5, at 1. Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire stress that the key feature of AAP is that the personal
creditors of the parties they refer to as "owners" of the business cannot compel dissolution of the business to
satisfy creditors' claims against the "owners." Hansmann et al., supra note 5, at 1. In fact, these authors
define a legal entity as an organization that exhibits AAP. Id. at 11 ("[We view AAP as the central legal
characteristic of modem organizations."). Protecting the business from the personal creditors of the
participants in the business may have been important to business entrepreneurs of the nineteenth century.
However, as we shall see, it may have been even more important that neither the individual shareholders
of firms that were incorporated, nor their heirs, could compel dissolution of an incorporated business in
order to withdraw their share of the value of the business.
10. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (1991) (summarizing the
early history of limited liability). Limited liability shifts some of the risk of the business to nonshareholder
participants. Modem finance theory casts doubt on whether mere risk shifting, by itself, should reduce the
overall costs of capital (or other inputs). Also, historians have raised considerable doubt about whether
limited liability was the primary reason for seeking a corporate charter in the first half of the nineteenth
century. See the discussion infra Part III.E.
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role, I stress in this Article the role played by the other side of asset partitioning,
which I call "resource commitment."" Hansmann and Kraakman have recently
argued, similarly, that "the truly essential aspect of asset partitioning is... the
reverse of limited liability-namely, the shielding of the assets of the entity from
claims of the creditors of the entity's owners or managers.""
Perhaps as important as protecting the assets of the enterprise from partici-
pants' creditors, however, was the role that incorporation played in establishing
a pool of assets that was not subject to being liquidated or dissolved by any of
the individual participants who might want to recover their investment. This
role extends also to the heirs of these participants, who might prefer to see the
assets of the business liquidated rather than accept a pro rata claim on potential
distributions from the business in the settlement of the estate of the deceased
corporate participant. Such a protected pool of assets could therefore be
committed more credibly to the enterprise for a substantial amount of time.
Investors in corporate shares could subscribe in small units, but once the funds
paid to purchase those shares had been committed, limits were imposed-some-
times severe ones-on the ability of investors to withdraw funds from the
business." The commitment of capital by shareholders, I argue, helped protect
the at-risk investments made by other corporate participants. To again use a
phrase from Hansmann and Kraakman, the capital contributed or pledged in the
form of equity shares helped secure a pool of "bonding assets,"' 4 which made it
easier to draw in other risky contributions to the enterprise. The most impor-
tant other investors in the first half of the nineteenth century probably included
11. Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire also suggest that limited liability is not as central to entity
form, nor even to the ability to raise capital, as resource commitment. Hansmann et al., supra note 5, at
8-9.
12. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 390. Hansmann and Kraakman do not address the
importance of shielding the assets of the entity from the shareholders themselves, an important factor this
Article identifies. The possibility that one purpose of the corporate form was to prevent shareholders
themselves from prematurely withdrawing capital is not consistent with the notion that shareholders are
the "owners" (who, under standard definitions of ownership, ought to have the right to withdraw their
assets at any time). This further illustrates the reasons I believe it is important to avoid calling shareholders
"owners" of corporations. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Corporate "Ownership": A Misleading Word Muddies
the Corporate Governance Debate, BROOKINGS REV., Winter 1995, at 16.
13. Early corporations were often capitalized with "assessable" shares. EDWIN MERRICK DODD,
AMERICAN BusINEss CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MASSACHusETTS 74
(1954). "The usual method of financing .... business corporations during the period seems to have
been to obtain stock subscriptions on which little or nothing was paid at the outset, it being expected
that all or most of the money needed would be obtained by means of future calls." When the company
incorporated, for example, it might issue 1000 shares of stock at $100 per share, but it might allow investors
to buy in by paying only, say, $10 per share up front, and pledging to pay up to the remaining $90 per
share if subsequently assessed by the board. Thus early shareholders were often not only committed to the
amount they had already paid in, but could be required to pay in more later. See the discussion infra notes
165-167 and accompanying text.
14. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 392.
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banks and trade creditors (as well as the other shareholders), but the mecha-
nism of separate entity status, and the resulting ability to lock in the assets, pro-
tected the interests of nonfinancial contributors assets as well as the interests of
financial investors.
5
Which brings us to the second critical contribution of corporate law, as it
evolved in the nineteenth century. Incorporating a firm created a governance
mechanism which separated the role of contributing financial capital from the
role of operating the business and making regular decisions about the use of assets
in the business. When a corporation is formed, initial investors not only commit
a pool of capital to be used in the business, but they also yield control over the
business assets and activities to a board of directors that is legally independent of
both shareholders and managers. This Article argues that such a yielding of legal
control rights by equity investors and other corporate participants became
increasingly important in bringing together teams of managers who specialized
in running the business, as well as in establishing long-term stable relationships
with suppliers and customers.
6
Entity status and separate governance, then, facilitated the accumulation
of what business historian Alfred Chandler has called "organizational capabili-
ties." Chandler's broad and groundbreaking work documents the development
and growth of dozens of the great corporate enterprises that came to dominate
their markets by the early twentieth century. He claims that the accumulation
of organizational capabilities was perhaps the single most important factor con-
tributing to long-term sustained profitability and growth in these dominant
companies. 7 By themselves, entity status and separate governance do not
15. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the state legislature granting the corpo-
rate charter also often granted the enterprise some special franchise, such as the right-of-way to build a
turnpike, or the right to supply water to some community. In such a case, one could argue that the state
or community had also committed resources (the franchise, the right-of-way, the special access to markets,
etc.) to the corporation that were subsequently at risk in the enterprise. Later in this Article I will argue
that a substantial amount of specialized "human capital" was also often put at risk in business ventures.
See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
16. Another role governance separation played, which has been emphasized more strongly in the
literature to date, is that it enabled financial capital investors to play a more passive role, which made
their investments easier to partition and trade, and therefore easier to diversify. But investors in the earliest
corporations were rarely very diversified, and liquid markets for trading in corporate shares did not develop
much until the second half of the nineteenth century. See ROBERT E. WRIGHT, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS REDISCOVERED (2002) (discussing the history of the development of financial markets in the
United States prior to 1850); see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 59-60 (1977) [hereinafter VISIBLE HAND] (noting that ten of the
largest corporations in the United States in the 1820s were in Lowell, Massachusetts, and "[tihe shares
of these firms were closely held").
17. Organizational capabilities "accounted for the long-term persistence of profits by the same
players over the decades." Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of
the Industrial Enterprise, 6 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1992, at 79, 83. See also ALFRED D. CHANDLER,
JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM (1990) [hereinafter SCALE AND
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ensure the success of a business. But once the initial capital had been contrib-
uted by equity investors, entity status and separate governance helped keep that
capital in the enterprise, and thereby helped the firm draw in other valuable
resources. If the resources were successfully used, the firm could accumulate
both organizational and reputational assets, as well as additional specialized
physical assets. These tangible and intangible assets, in turn, further increased
the pool of bonding assets in the firm, facilitating the continued use of special-
ized assets.
This Article lays out this basic argument, supported at this point by evi-
dence that is largely anecdotal and circumstantial. This evidence consists of the
fact that other organizational forms such as individual proprietorships, partner-
ships, and so-called "joint stock" companies (which were considered a species
of partnership) were available to organizers of business enterprises and were
commonly used at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But none of these
forms created organizations with "entity" status, in the sense that property could
be held in the name of the entity, rather than in the name of the individuals
involved in the enterprise, and none established governance mechanisms that
were clearly separate from the participants. 8 But at that time, few business
enterprises employed more than about a hundred people, and none employed
thousands. As technological developments began to make larger scale business
possible and more profitable, the demand for the corporate form grew dramati-
cally. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, business people were
clamoring to use the corporate form, and states were accommodating them by
passing increasingly general and less restrictive chartering rules.
As the corporate form became more widely and readily available, it appears,
more businesses began to accumulate and use such organizational assets as hierar-
SCOPE], in which he argues that the failure of British companies to make the necessary investments in
organizational capabilities, at least relative to leading industrial firms in the United States and Germany,
led to Britain's decline in economic power during the second industrial revolution. See generally VISIBLE
HAND, supra note 16 (winning the Pulitzer Prize for its classic analysis of late nineteenth century business
history). According to George David Smith and Davis Dyer, "Chandler's account of the managerial
revolution... proved so compelling that few historians of business and technology took issue with it."
George David Smith & Davis Dyer, The Rise and Transformation of the American Corporation, in THE
AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 28, 34 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996). More recently, business historians
Naomi Lamoreaux, Daniel Raff, and Peter Temin have more narrowly positioned Chandler's work as
describing one type of solution to ubiquitous information asymmetry and coordination problems and
their associated transactions costs, which arose in the particular technological and social environment of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and Hierarchies:
Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History, 108 AM. HIST. REV. 404 (2003).
18. Today partnerships can be recognized as having entity status. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON
EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 39-41 (8th ed. 2000) (discuss-
ing the history of the legal debate about whether a partnership should be regarded as an "entity" or an
"aggregate"). Other hybrid forms of organization are available, such as limited liability partnerships and
limited liability corporations. Id. at 342-72.
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chical management systems, internal information and control systems, structured
internal approaches to research and development activities, specialized marketing
operations, internal training programs, and the development and management
of portfolios of patents, brand identities, and other intellectual capital. These
intangible systems and organizational structures helped make the institution of
the corporation durable, even as the individual participants came and went. 9
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the problem of large-
scale production as a "team production" problem and discusses the contracting
problems that arise in such production." The essence of the team production
problem is that varied inputs from a number of individuals are needed, these
inputs are difficult or impossible to monitor or specify contractually, and the
output is a joint output, not readily divisible or attributable to individual inputs.
These inputs and investments are often enterprise-specific, because their value,
once they have been sunk into the enterprise, is tied to the overall success of the
enterprise. The specificity, or "sunk" quality of the investments, increases the
difficulty of writing simple contracts among individuals that could elicit and
coordinate the use of such inputs. Part I argues that it might be possible and
efficient to organize small production "teams" using individual proprietorships or
partnerships-both of which could be established without special charters
under common law. But, as teams get larger and team members become
increasingly specialized, these two forms of organization become increasingly
constraining.
Part II argues that by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century,
business people were experimenting with organizational forms that would give
them the benefits that we now associate with corporations. In particular, they
began forming so-called "joint stock companies" that utilized trust law, in com-
bination with partnership law, to lock in the business assets, yet provide liquid-
ity to the investors.21 They also increasingly sought corporate charters from state
legislatures.2 Part II explores the history of the use of the unincorporated joint
stock company, showing why this form was ultimately less successful than the
corporate form.
Part III traces the history of the corporate form in particular, how it was
used by organizers of commercial enterprises. The chartering of business corpo-
rations enabled business organizers to create organizations that the law regarded
19. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE 14 (1982) (defining and discussing "routines" in business institutions as one of the
mechanisms by which the knowledge gained from prior experience is stored in corporations).
20. Lynn Stout and I argue that the role of independent boards of directors in corporations can
be understood as a solution to a "team production" problem. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
21. See the discussion infra Part II.
22. See the discussion infra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
395
HeinOnline  -- 51 UCLA L. Rev. 395 2003-2004
51 UCLA LAW REVIEW 387 (2003)
as separate entities, with governance that was separated, at least formally, from
the contribution of capital. This could not be accomplished under common law
rules for individual proprietorships and ordinary partnerships, and the joint stock
form was unable to fully accomplish legal entity status. Originally these features
may not have been the thing that most attracted business organizers to the cor-
porate form,23 but as the opportunities to increase the scale of production became
more obvious and attractive over time, these features became more important.
Entity status and separate governance, I argue, provided a new solution to the
"team production" problem because these innovations encouraged corporate
team members to make credible commitments to each other to continue-and
perhaps expand-their investments in the business. The holding of business
assets in corporate form helped bond these commitments.24
In Part IV, I discuss the emergence of large-scale enterprise, and the corre-
sponding development of a social class of highly skilled "professional" manag-
ers, scientists, technicians, and marketing specialists employed by large
corporations. Other scholars have studied the rapid expansion of share owner-
ship during the late nineteenth century," and have asked why thousands of
middle class people were (and continue to be today) willing to invest their
savings in organizations and enterprises over which they exercise little control
or influence. But few have asked the question of why thousands of similar people
might have also been willing, in the late nineteenth century, to give up their
independent farms and small businesses, and commit their livelihoods and repu-
tations to organizations they did not control and over which they had no
23. Early corporations, which were created by special charters issued by legislatures, nearly
always came with special privileges or franchises. See the discussion infra note 139 and accompanying
text. The political pressure for general incorporation statutes was driven by a democratic impulse to
eliminate these special privileges. See HURST, supra note 4, at 32-33; see also SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 6
(describing how general incorporation laws had the "effect of democratizing entrepreneurship" and also
equalized opportunities). But if incorporation did not provide special privileges, why would new business
organizers want to use the corporate form? The historical works I have examined generally assert, or
proceed on the assumption that, incorporation was attractive even without special franchises, but few
scholars have directly addressed the question of why.
24. Michael J. Whincop, Entrepreneurial Governance, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL
FINANCING GAP: LINKING GOVERNANCE WITH REGULATORY POLICY (Michael J. Whincop ed.,
2001), at 90. Whincop notes:
[The corporate form ... locks each of the parties into the enterprise, and denies them ready
exit. Adopting this form enables parties to give credible commitments to stay with the enter-
prise, which may be of value when the enterprise involves developing assets with idiosyncratic
value over a substantial period of time.
Id. (citing Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Mawh-Specific Assets and
Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L 913,919-20 (1999)). The context of Whincop's
statement is modem small start-up firms utilizing capital from investment "angels." The context of Rock
and Wachter's related claim is closely held corporations.
25. See, e.g., Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities,
1887-1902, 29 Bus. HIsT. REV. 105 (1955).
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property rights.26 I hypothesize that both kinds of investors were drawn in by
the fact that the organizations in question-business corporations-were increas-
ingly likely to be backed by substantial "bonding assets" of both a tangible and
intangible type.
The corporate form does not now seem so unique or remarkable, so that its
benefits might seem trivial. But it is worth exploring what it was that made the
corporate form so attractive to business organizers as the U.S. economy moved
from an agrarian, small-scale production economy to a large and modem indus-
trial economy. In the Conclusion, I speculate that understanding this process
may help shed light on the problems plaguing the economic transitions underway
around the world, as well as on governance arrangements in small start-up firms.
I suggest that entity status, together with legal separation of governance, helped
to protect and encourage coordinated, specialized investments by all of the con-
stituents of the enterprise.
I. ORGANIZING TEAM PRODUCTION
It is, perhaps, self-evident that it takes substantial capital resources to build
and operate a railroad. Land must be purchased or rights-of-way obtained, steel
track must be laid down, engines, freight cars, passenger cars, and stations must
be purchased or built, staffed, and maintained, and dependable supplies of coal or
other fuel supplies must be arranged. All of these resources, once invested, are
likely to be difficult to liquidate or redeploy to another type of business.
Similarly, large-scale production of manufactured goods often requires substantial
amounts of committed capital resources to build factories and warehouses, secure
raw materials, and finance inventories of goods headed to market; and there is a
corresponding dearth of potential buyers for unused or unwanted business assets.
Economists, historians, business leaders, and policymakers have long understood
the importance to industrialization and economic development of the ability to
amass large amounts of physical and financial capital.
26. Historian Olivier Zunz explores this question in analyzing the emergence of a class of middle
managers. See OLIVIER ZUNZ, MAKING AMERICA CORPORATE, 1870-1920, at 39 (1990). Zunz asks:
If the republican virtues of smallness and independence were so deeply ingrained in the middle
class, how were corporations able to break into this class so easily and coopt large parts of it? Was
it easy to take a successful professional away from private practice and entice him to work for a
corporation? Did corporations offer other inducements besides a good salary? In other words,
why did a part of the middle class participate in the corporate political economy and the other
resist it?
Id. Zunz' answer is that, even though middle managers in corporations were not paid particularly well
relative to their peers who were independent entrepreneurs or professionals, they apparently gained psychic
benefits and personal satisfaction from the opportunity to direct substantial corporate resources. See id. at
49 (discussing the motives of middle managers at the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy railroad). Also, see
the discussion infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
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Less well understood and appreciated by economists, but long recognized
by business people, is the fact that building a railroad also requires substantial
intangible inputs, like technology and management skill.27 Finance capital and
physical capital do not operate themselves. They must be coordinated, man-
aged, maintained, and operated daily by people, who must then develop sys-
tems, routines, and reputational and information networks to carry out their
tasks. Production and distribution on a large scale, then, requires a wide variety
of inputs from many different individuals." Often, the needed inputs are highly
specialized to particular tasks, and difficult to specify in advance, but must be
worked out over a long period of time."
A. The Team Production Problem
To begin to understand the problem of finding an adequate legal structure
for assembling and coordinating multiple complex inputs in order to undertake
large-scale production processes, it is useful to start with an examination of
27. See, e.g., id. at 37 ("Railway management in all its various departments may be said to
involve the employment and the patronage of all the arts and sciences.") (citing The Railway Review,
Mar. 19, 1892). Chandler analyzes the economic development and growth led by large corporations in the
United States as being the product of a "revolution" in the ability of business to marshal and coordinate
management skill and resources. See VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16. The idea in economic theory that new
ideas are themselves an important force for economic change and development goes back at least to
Schumpeter, but until the last decade or so mainstream economists have modeled technological change
as the residual-or unexplained part--of economic growth. Only lately have mainstream economists
undertaken serious efforts to explicitly model the accumulation of knowledge and expertise as an important
factor in economic growth. See generally Richard R, Nelson & Paul M. Romer, Science, Economic Growth,
mid Public Policy, in TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 49 (Bruce L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield
eds., 1996) (discussing the importance of knowledge and ideas in the theory of economic growth).
28. PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 8 (1972). Drucker observes that "the
essence" of large-scale modem organization and production is that, within organizations,
people of very diverse skills and knowledges work together. This, traditionally, could never be
done except in very small groups, teams of four or five at most. Today we do it-or at least
try-with very large numbers--thousands of people with different knowledges, coming together
in a business, a government agency, or an armed service-under a management with specific
knowledge of building and directing the large-scale organization.
Id. Chandler focuses on how business organizations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
assembled a large cadre of middle-level managers, divided up and coordinated their responsibilities, and
developed new techniques of accounting and reporting to help coordinate their efforts. VISIBLE HAND,
supra note 16. Zunz discusses the development of a large social class of middle managers. ZUNZ, supra
note 26.
29. For example, Glenn Porter and Harold Livesay note that manufactured machinery, like agricul-
tural machinery and sewing machines "were technologically complex, expensive items requiring close and
often extended contact between manufacturer and consumer or required elaborate innovative marketing
apparatus." GLENN PORTER & HAROLD C. LIVESAY, MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS: STUDIES IN
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY MARKETING 4 (1971).
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the contracting problems that arise in what economists call "team production"
situations.0
Team production is simply production that requires various inputs of dif-
fering types from two or more individuals, and for which the output is not easily
separable into the components that are attributable to the various inputs indi-
vidually." Because inputs are complex and may not even be well understood at
the beginning of the enterprise, it is difficult or impossible to write contracts
among the team members specifying what each is to contribute. And because
the outputs cannot be broken up into the parts each team member is responsi-
ble for, there is no obvious way that the outputs (or losses, as may happen in a
risky venture) should be divided up among the team members.
In 1793, for example, a group of men formed a type of partnership called a
"joint stock company" with the idea of mining coal in Pennsylvania. The Lehigh
Coal Mine Company (the Company) purchased one tract of land which already
had a small mine on it, and acquired options from the State of Pennsylvania for
about 10,000 more acres believed to bear substantial amounts of coal.32 Over
the next fourteen years, members of the Company periodically attempted to
mine coal from the area, and then to get it to market either by floating it down
the Lehigh River, which was not navigable during much of the year, or by trans-
porting it in wagons over virtually impassable roads. The Company attempted
numerous times to get the State of Pennsylvania to improve the navigation of
the river, or to improve the road, to no avail. In order to construct the necessary
transportation improvements itself, it called for further contributions from its
subscribers "until calling was useless."33 The Company was never able to make
money at this enterprise during that period.
The example illustrates a team production problem: Two of the necessary
inputs (the coal in the ground and the knowledge and skill at mining it), had
little value unless the product could be brought to market cheaply. The venture
30. Stout and I review economic theories of the contracting problems in team production in
Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 265-87.
31. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz are generally viewed as having been the first to use the
phrase and define the concept for use in economic modeling. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Prodtion, Infomrmtion Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). See Blair &
Stout, supra note 20, at 265-67, for a discussion of Alchian and Demsetz' theoretical contribution.
32. ORDER OF THE BOARD OF MANAGERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEHIGH COAL AND
NAVIGATION COMPANY (1840) [hereinafter A HISTORY OF THE LEHIGH COAL AND NAVIGATION
COMPANY]. The original is in the special collection of the Hagley Museum and Library, in Wilmington,
Delaware.
33. Id. at 3. Investors in unincorporated joint stock companies, which were partnerships with some
but not all of the characteristics of corporations, were called "subscribers," or sometimes "stockholders"
because they jointly contributed the capital stock used by the partnership. See infra Part II for more
discussion of the differences between unincorporated joint stock companies and corporations. The Lehigh
Coal Mining Company was an unincorporated joint stock company. LIVERMORE, supra note 4, at 240.
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needed a third input: a functional transportation system. But just as the coal
could have no market without the transportation system, the transportation
system might have no use (at least initially) without the coal. Whoever invested
in either part of the whole enterprise would be dependent upon investments
being made in the other part of the enterprise for the project to have value.
Dispirited after fourteen years without success, the Company began leasing
its land and mineral rights to others. In 1817, another partnership involving
Josiah White, Erskine Hazard, and George F. A. Hauto, which operated a wire-
making works in Philadelphia, wanted to purchase anthracite coal cheaply for use
in their factory. They visited the Lehigh mines, studied the problem of naviga-
tion on the river, and discovered that the most recent law governing river
improvement on the Lehigh River had expired. The team of White, Hazard,
and Hauto then negotiated a twenty-year lease with the first Company for the
coal lands, in exchange for an annual rent of one ear of corn, and a promise to
deliver at least 40,000 bushels of coal annually to Philadelphia and surrounding
districts. The team then sought an act authorizing them to improve the naviga-
tion of the Lehigh, and the act was passed in 1818."4 In exchange for this right,
the team was to construct a "slack-water navigation" system on the river from
Stoddartsville to Easton, a distance of approximately fifty miles. The team then
planned to construct a series of "wing dams and channel walls" in the river so
that the water would, at all points, be deep enough that a flat boat loaded with
coal could float down the river without running aground on rocks in the river.36
White, Hazard, and Hauto would also have to construct usable roads from the
coal mines to the river. The three decided it would be feasible to do these things,
at a cost that would make it worthwhile.
The next problem this new team faced was raising the money to fund their
project. Their plan was to do this by seeking subscribers in a new joint stock
company they wanted to form for that purpose. But before discussing how they
did that, I will briefly review the generic problems that tend to arise in team
production situations, and the various organizational forms that were available
under the law at the time to White, Hazard, and Hauto.
As already mentioned, two characteristics of team production are that
production requires complex, difficult-to-specify inputs from a number of per-
sons, and the output is not easily separable into the portions that are attribut-
34. A HISTORY OFTHE LEHIGH COAL AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, supra note 32, at 4-5.
35. According to Webster's Revised Unabrd Dcionary, a "slack-water navigation" system refers
to "navigation in a stream the depth of which has been increased, and the current diminished, by a dam or
dams." WEBSTER'S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OFTHE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1351 (1913).
36. A HISTORY OF THE LEHIGH COAL AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, supra note 32, at 6. The
partners estimated that the river fell at a rate of twenty-five feet per mile from Stoddartsville to Mauch
Chunk, a distance of about 36.5 miles, and then fell another 364 feet from Mauch Chunk to Easton, a
distance of about fourteen miles. Id. at 6-7.
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able to each input provider individually. We have already seen that the inputs
needed to bring anthracite coal to market in sufficient quantity and at a suffi-
ciently low cost to be profitable included the physical inputs of coal-bearing land,
plus labor and management, plus a useful transportation system. Because all were
needed, the application of any one of the inputs by itself could not achieve the
goal of bringing coal to market. The inputs must be used together and coordi-
nated. Hence, the value provided by the coal lands could not be separated from
the value provided by the river navigation system.
But consider just the transportation side of the equation, and briefly assume
that it would have value by itself. Then suppose, for example, that Hauto was
particularly adept at fund raising and business management, that Hazard was
good at hiring and managing unskilled and skilled workers using available
earth-moving and construction equipment to construct the wing dams and
channel walls, and White was particularly clever mechanically (as, in fact, he
turned out to be). Moreover, suppose (as was the case) that these three men do
not have enough financial capital to undertake the project on their own, so they
have to seek inputs from investors. All of the participants in the enterprise are
needed to undertake the river navigation project, but there will be no obvious
way to decide who should get what out of the joint project.
Team production problems are made much more complicated if the inputs
are complex and difficult to specify in advance, and if, once invested in the
joint enterprise, the inputs cannot be readily recovered and redeployed to other
uses-at least not without significant losses in value-so that some of the
investment is inherently "enterprise specific." This will undoubtedly be the
case in this venture.37 The rights granted by the state to improve the navigation
of the river cannot be redeployed if the venture fails. Neither can the time and
effort spent by the three partners. And once paid out in wages to workers, for
supplies and cash and renting earth-moving equipment, the money contributed
by the financial investors cannot be redeployed either. The value of these invest-
ments will ultimately be tied to the success (or failure) of the enterprise as a
whole." On whatever terms White, Hazard, Hauto, and their investors go into
37. Chandler stresses that investments in physical and organizational assets made by the earliest
large business corporations were often highly enterprise-specific. See, e.g., VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at
87 (describing the specialized investments and specialized skills and training required to operate a railroad).
38. The literature on the importance of "asset specificity" in choice of organizational form is now
too voluminous to cite in derail, but much of this literature goes back to Oliver Williamson, who has argued
in numerous articles and books that "asset specificity" is one of the key characteristics that increases the
transaction costs of organizing such production through market transactions. See, e.g., Oliver E.
Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537, 1548
(1981) ("The production cost advantages of markets decrease and the (comparative) governance costs
of markets increase as assets become progressively more specific."). See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); OLIVER E.
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business together, there may be positive rents, or losses, that will have to be
shared in some way. Under many of the possible sharing rules each would be vul-
nerable if any of the other members of the "team" were to embezzle from the
business, use assets of the business for their personal benefit, fail to work hard, or
just mismanage their part of the business. Each would also be vulnerable to what
economists have called a "hold-up problem"-the problem that one partner
might use the threat of walking away from the business (and possibly forcing
dissolution) to extract a greater share of the rents from the others (or a smaller
share of the losses).
Because the organization of the river navigation project will require the
participants in the venture to engage in a long-term business relationship with
uncertain returns, they must have some way of organizing their joint business
that allocates rewards and risks, assigns decision rights, provides incentives to
induce all team members to make the requisite investments, and discourages
holdups.
Consider the possibilities available to them. Imagine the participants
entering into a series of contracts among themselves. Suppose Hauto, for exam-
ple, had negotiated the grant of rights to improve the river by himself, so that
he alone would have the right to control use of the river's power for transporta-
tion purposes. He could contract with White to design the dams and channel
walls, and contract with Hazard to carry out the actual construction. Hazard,
in turn, could hire and oversee the workers who do the actual work. Hauto could
then try to borrow the necessary capital from a bank in Philadelphia, although
the bankers might require Hauto to put up substantial assets of his own as
collateral, because the project would obviously be very risky.
Under such a network-of-contracts approach, however, each of the par-
ticipants would probably be reluctant to extend himself or herself very far.39
The bank, as noted, would probably insist on collateral, forcing Hauto to bear
most of the risk personally. Hazard would also not want to bear the full risk of
the project, and would probably insist on dividing up the construction work into
segments, and being paid in advance for each segment. White would have little
incentive to be very creative about solving design and construction problems as
the project proceeds (and would probably be inclined to blame Hazard for poor
workmanship when such problems arose).
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) [hereinafter ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS].
39. CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that "[tihe greater the
team-specific investment made[,]... the less satisfactory will be [the] organization as an implicit team").
O'Kelley and Thompson's notion of "implicit team" refers to a group of individuals whose inputs are coor-
dinated through a series of contracts or understandings, but not through any form of combined ownership
of, or legal control over, the inputs. See id. at 8-9.
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The potential incentive problems in this kind of complex project are
myriad, and endemic to enterprises that involve team production. Economists
and legal scholars have discussed these in the literature on relational contracts."
It is not my intention to revisit all of those arguments here. Instead, I take as a
premise that, by the nature of team production, it is extremely difficult to write
long-term contracts to organize such production because the expectations of
each party toward the other cannot be specified in a way that is enforceable by
a court.41 If the participants in the river improvement project try to specify all
the risks and rewards in advance, each will have some incentive to put risk off
onto the others, or to shirk in ways that are hard to detect by a court, or to hold
up the other parties. Instead, suppose that they all agree on vague terms by
which they will work together, and further agree to decide later how to divide up
the proceeds after they see how well the business does. In such a case, each will
have an incentive to expend resources positioning himself or herself to capture
more of the proceeds. Hazard may try to buy new earth-moving equipment for
himself, which would enhance his ability to contract for other construction
projects in the future, but then try to charge the cost of the new earth-moving
equipment to the project. Similarly, White may spend more resources than
necessary traveling back and forth from the construction site to study its progress,
charging the business for his time and travel expenses. If, say, White were also
responsible for seeking commitments from other coal miners in the area to bring
their coal-hauling business to the Lehigh River, he might incur unnecessary
42
expenses in cultivating relationships with those potential customers.
These kinds of contracting problems might well be alleviated if the three
individuals and their investors share community or family ties that might encour-
age them to trust each other, or to behave in trustworthy ways. 43 But one of the
40. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON ET AL, COURTS AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS (Nat'I Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8572, 2001) (finding that while relationships are the basis of most
transactions between firms, the effectiveness of courts also has a perceptible effect on the level of trust in
business relationships); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law,
19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 17-27 (1981) (presenting empirical evidence supporting the idea of contracts
enforced by social relationships); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 55-67 (1963) (introducing the concept of "relational" contracts as contracts
supported by a network of relationships rather than by courts).
41. It may not be possible in advance to describe in detail what each party must do, and/or a court
may not be able to verify whether either of them fulfilled their obligations under the contract.
42. Zunz tells the story of an independent sales agent for E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder
Company who had a dispute with headquarters over relationship-building expenses the agent wanted to
bill to the company, including "[clontribution to fund for family of miner killed in mine," "[aissisting miner
in burial of child," and "[piresent to party for information regarding party who was said to use L. & R.
powder." ZUNZ, supra note 26, at 32. These and similar relationship-building expenses became the
cause of tension between the firm and the sales agent. Id.
43. Unsurprisingly, Stout and I find that people who share a common group identity are more
likely to trust each other and to be trustworthy toward one another. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
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key features of the United States in the early nineteenth century was that people
were beginning to perceive opportunities to expand production, transportation,
and marketing beyond their own communities, and were seeking ways to do that.
Nothing in the historical record of the Lehigh Companies suggest that there were
family ties among the participants, although many business relationships of this
period involved such ties.44 Absent such constraining forces, what other ways
could the team members structure their legal relationship to reduce contracting
costs?
In the early nineteenth century, the law provided four basic approaches to
organizing the team production enterprise into a single "firm": (1) Individual pro-
prietorships, in which a lone team member would own or finance all the assets
of the business, be personally responsible for all the debts and other obligations
of the business, and hire the others as employees or contractors; (2) partnerships,
in which the participants would jointly own and manage the assets of the
business and share responsibility for the liabilities of the business; (3) unincor-
porated joint stock companies, which were a type of partnership that made it
easier to raise capital from passive partners; and (4) corporations. The next part
briefly discusses the advantages of individual proprietorships and simple partner-
ships, although neither of these organizational forms would work for Hazard,
White, and Hauto, because, even among all three of them, they did not have
enough capital to take on the river navigation project.
In Part II, then, I consider how Hazard, White, and Hauto might address
some of their problems by forming a joint stock company, and in Part III I review
the evolution of the corporate form for use in business enterprises in the United
States, and discuss why, ultimately, these three individuals sought a special
charter from the state of Pennsylvania by which they could incorporate their
business.
B. Individual Proprietorship
Oliver Williamson was among the first economists to observe that busi-
ness relationships such as those required for a large-scale transportation or
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735
(2001).
44. Chandler tells us that until well after 1840, "the family remained the basic business unit."
VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 16. Teemu Ruskola discusses what he calls "clan corporations" in China,
which were professionally managed commercial enterprises organized in the form of a family. See Teemu
Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese
Perspective, 52 STAN. L REV. 1599 (2000). Traditional Chinese family law, he argues, "performed many of
the functions that modem American corporation law performs today." Id. at 1606. Of the unincorporated
businesses that managed to achieve large scale in the United States by the early twentieth century, I would
guess that all or nearly all of them were managed by members of an extended family, but I have not yet
done the research to confirm this.
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manufacturing business involve a high level of transaction costs if the parties
attempt to organize their activities through market transactions or contracts.4"
Thus, he and others have proposed that such businesses will be more efficient if
ownership and control over all the assets used in the business are concentrated
into the hands of a single owner and decisionmaker.46 In principle, an individual
proprietorship could achieve this. In a business organized as a proprietorship, a
single entrepreneur-owner would own or lease the physical assets used in the
business, hire other individuals to supplement her own efforts, pay fixed salaries
or wages to such employees, be liable for any debts, and receive any profits from
the business.47
At the turn of the nineteenth century, most manufacturing and trading
businesses were organized as individual proprietorships or partnerships.4" In 1817,
for example, Dr. Charles Lukens of Philadelphia, bought out the interests of his
father-in-law and another partner in the Brandywine Iron Works and Nail
Factory. Lukens leased the factory building and property from them, and took
over operation of the factory as a sole proprietor.49 As sole proprietor, he would
have had to hire workers and perhaps a shop floor supervisor to see that the nails
and other iron products were produced to specifications, that the equipment was
maintained, and raw materials utilized efficiently. Under the common law that
would have been well established in the early nineteenth century, the shop floor
45. Williamson does not use the phrase "team production," but builds his analysis of markets and
organizational hierarchies around the problem of organizing production activities in which there are seri-
ous information problems, individuals have limits on their ability to calculate and weigh the relevant risks
and rewards ("bounded rationality"), specific investments must be made, and individuals are not perfectly
trustworthy, but instead are "opportunistic." See ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 38, at 47.
46. See generally Id.; Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 119 (1988); Hart & Moore, supra note 6; Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L & ECON. 297 (1978). None of these economists,
however, considers the question of how the choice of legal organizational form for the business affects the
allocation rights, powers, and protections available to the individual firm participants. See Naomi R.
Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations and the Limits on Contractual Freedom in the U.S. History: An Essay
in Economics, Law, and Culture (unpublished manuscript) (considering the impact of organizational
form on these questions in the nineteenth century).
47. Individual proprietorships would thus provide for centralization of control of the business which
is one of the benefits of incorporation discussed in the Introduction. But the amount of capital that can be
amassed by an individual proprietorship is limited by the wealth and borrowing capacity of the proprietor,
and there would be no way to ensure that the capital could be committed beyond the lifetime or attention
span of the individual proprietor.
48. See the discussion infra Part I.C.
49. The Brandywine Iron Works and Nail Factory later came to be called Lukens Steel Company.
Some of the basic factual details about the company in this account are taken from CHRISTOPHER T.
BAER, A GUIDE TO THE HISTORY AND RECORDS OF THE LUKENS STEEL COMPANY, accession 50
(1994), which documents the corporate records of this enterprise preserved at the Hagley Museum and
Library in Wilmington, Delaware. Other hypothetical details are based solely on my own speculation.
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supervisor would probably be an "agent" of Lukens,"° able to enter into contracts
for the sale of products or the purchase of raw materials on behalf of the business.
Lukens, in turn, might pay the supervisor and workers fixed wages, or alterna-
tively, Lukens might hire the supervisor as an independent contractor, and then
the supervisor (or "foreman") might hire, manage, and pay the individual
unskilled workers himself, out of his pay from Lukens.5' The courts at the time
would recognize and enforce Lukens' property rights in, and associated respon-
sibilities for, the business and its output, and would enforce the terms of the
employment relationship between Lukens and each of the others. Lukens might
also hire an independent agent to sell the products of his factory for him.52 In
dealing with third parties, Lukens would be held responsible for liabilities of the
business, even if the foreman had signed the contract incurring liabilities on
behalf of Lukens.
By addressing the team production problem in this manner, Lukens would
be motivated to work hard, and to cultivate new markets. He would also want to
find better ways to reduce costs and manage the accounts of the business. Lukens
might, for example, want to hire someone with engineering or other technical
skills to develop new products or new methods of producing products, or he
might have to learn these skills himself.3 If the business were organized as a
proprietorship, however, the incentives of all of his employees to undertake these
initiatives on their own could be expected to be substantially attenuated, and
there could be other "agency" problems as well in the relationship between
Lukens and his employees and agents. 4
Until about the last two decades, the "theory of the firm" under mainstream
economics envisioned "firms" essentially as individual proprietorships. Even
now, in introductory economics texts, firms are generally modeled as bundles of
physical assets (for example, a factory and some machines) owned by an entre-
50. See, e.g., HURST, supra note 4, at 5 ("[Tlhe common law early and consistently recognized
binding relations of principal and agent, between themselves as well as to third parties.").
51. Such an approach to organizing unskilled labor in factories, known as "inside contracting," was
apparently common early in the industrial revolution. See Peter Cappelli, Market-Mediated Employment:
The Historical Context, in THE NEW RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION
(Margaret M. Blair & Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000).
52. Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt note that early factories were often owned by engineers
who provided the technical expertise. See LOUIS GALAMBOS & JOSEPH PRATT, THE RISE OF THE
CORPORATE COMMONWEALTH 20 (1988). These factories produced generic, unbranded products, and
their owners did not typically have much marketing expertise. Therefore, they often hired independent
agents to market their products for them. ZUNZ, supra note 26, at 13.
53. In 1824, Lukens' factory was the first in America to roll boiler plate, and Lukens cultivated
the market for this product. Lukens also rolled the sheet iron for the first experimental iron-hulled
steamboat in 1825. BAER, supra note 49, at 1.
54. See, e.g., PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 214 (1992) ("The general problem of motivating one person or organization to act on
behalf of another is known among economists as the principal-agent problem.").
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preneur, who hires units of undifferentiated labor to run the factory and operate
the machines.55 In the 1960s, theorists began looking at the implications for firm
behavior of the fact that the managers of large corporations were hired agents.
As agents rather than owners, they might not have an incentive to maximize the
profits from the operation of the factory.56 Then, by the late 1970s, theorists
began to model the relationship between investors in corporations and the hired
managers of these firms as "agency" relationships, 7 as if the role played by share-
holders in contemporary corporations corresponded neatly to the role played by
individual proprietors in small businesses. Subsequently, a vast legal literature
has grown up around the idea that corporate directors and managers are "agents"
of shareholders.
Today, to the extent that mainstream economic theorists attempt to "open
the black box" to understand what goes on inside corporations, they generally
model a corporation as a "nexus of contracts" rather than as a separate entity. I
hypothesize below, however, that incorporation transforms the relationships
among contributors of financial and human capital into something different from
a simple agency relationship, and that understanding the role of separate entity
status under the law is critical to understanding how this happens. But first, I
consider the problems that may arise in business relationships between the firm
and third parties when a business is organized as an individual proprietorship.
In a proprietorship of any size that purchases supplies and sells output to
parties outside the business, credibility with customers and suppliers, as well
as specialized employees, will depend almost entirely on the proprietor's skill,
personal relationships, and reputation as a business person, or on relationships
and reputation that his direct agents build up." The fact that the proprietor's
personal reputation is at stake in the business might make him more account-
able to suppliers, creditors, or customers with whom he deals directly than his
agent might be. But the identity between the proprietor and the business makes
the business itself more vulnerable to things that happen to the proprietor, not
only within the business context, but also to exogenous factors such as his good
health and whether his fortunes in other aspects of his life permit him to keep his
assets invested in the business. If he dies, a descendent or other relative might
55. See, e.g., JOHN B. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 165-78 (3d ed. 2001).
56. See generally ROBIN MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL" CAPITALISM
(1964); OuVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR (1964).
57. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2; see also Fama, supra note 2; Fama & Jensen, supra note
2; Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984).
58. Early entrepreneurs often tried to build up trustworthy reputations in the communities where
they operated by contributing to local eleemosynary institutions. See Peter Dobkin Hall, What the Mer-
chants Did With Their Money: Charitable and Testamentary Trusts in Massachusetts, 1780-1880, in
ENTREPRENEURS: THE BOSTON BUSINESS COMMUNITY, 1700-1850, at 371 (Conrad Edick Wright &
Katheryn P. Viens eds., 1997).
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take up the business, or the business could be purchased from his estate by some-
one else. Charles Lukens, in fact, died suddenly in 1825. His widow, Rebecca
Lukens, who had inherited her father's share of the mill property the previous
year, then took over the commercial side of the ironworking business. 9 Her
brother-in-law, Solomon Lukens, left his farm to come serve as superintendent
of the factory, helping the family to keep the business going. But when such
things happen, the new proprietor must expend resources securing and perhaps
rebuilding those relationships.' Likewise, if there is a crisis in the proprietor's
family, the proprietor might have to pull resources out of the business to take care
of those needs.
Given these vulnerabilities, it would not be surprising if customers and
suppliers avoided being overly dependent on doing business with a single proprie-
tor and if machinists, foremen, bookkeepers, sales agents, and other skilled
workers might want to keep their options open by continuing to work for other
businesses too, rather than becoming specialized employees and agents of a sin-
gle individual. According to Alfred Chandler, there were no middle managers
at work anywhere in the economy as late as 1840.61
59. Rebecca Lukens thereby became, according to Baer's brief history, "the first woman in America
to operate an iron works." BAER, supra note 49, at 1. Prior to the reforms of the 1840s, married women
were not able to own property or even to protect it from the control of their husbands' creditors, regardless
of whether they acquired property prior to or during their marriage. If Rebecca Lukens had remarried prior
to the reform of married women's property laws in Pennsylvania in 1848, ownership of the mill would have
passed to her new husband. See Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 181)-1850, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1359, 1399 n.209 (1983).
60. The brief history provided by Baer in the documents collection at the Hagley Library does not
discuss whether Rebecca Lukens encountered significant prejudice when she attempted to deal with the
suppliers, customers, and colleagues of Charles Lukens. But she was apparently reasonably successful in
these commercial relationships. The business remained profitable, but did not grow much until 1840, when
Solomon Lukens left the business, and Joseph Bailey came in as a partner. At this point, the business was
renamed R.W. Lukens & Company. BAER, supra note 49, at 1.
61. VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 3. The exception might be the postal system, which had been
created by then. The Post Office Act of 1792 led to the switch from postriders to stagecoaches and a hub-
and-spoke system. Richard R. John, Elaborations, Revisions, Dissents: Alfred D. Chandler Jr.'s The Visible
Hand After Tuenty Years, 71 BuS. HIST. REV. 151, 186 (1997). This led the post office administration to
employ middle managers to staff distribution centers. Id. at 185. Chandler dates this organizational
innovation to the 1850s, when the postal service switched to the use of railroads to carry mail, though it
had actually occurred by 1800. Id. at 195-86. But the postal system did not have the problem that
Rebecca Lukens' steel mill or other individual proprietorships would have had-it was run by the U.S.
government, which could clearly make the necessary long-term commitment of resources to the
enterprise, and which would survive the coming and going of various individual managers. As of 1840,
most business enterprises were traditional single-unit enterprises, managed by their owners. VISIBLE
HAND, supra note 16, at 14. Virtually the only exceptions were specially chartered banks and franchises
to build and operate transportation infrastructure projects such as canals. These were likely to be organ-
ized as corporations.
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C. Partnerships
Returning to the Lehigh River navigation project, an obvious alternative
for Hazard, White, and Hauto-one which they had, in fact, already taken
advantage of by the time our story began-was to go into business together as
partners. Partnership, according to one commentator, is "probably the oldest
form of business organization."" Under common law in the early to mid-
nineteenth century, business people could form a partnership simply by agree-
ing to act as partners and by agreeing to share the profits from the business
(as well as the net assets in the event of a liquidation).63
Under the rules of partnership that would have applied at the time,6'
assets used in the business might be joint property of the partners, or owned
separately by any one of the partners and leased to the business. If owned jointly,
it might have been contributed to the business by a partner in exchange for the
partnership share, or purchased with partnership funds.65 Contracts entered into
with third parties by any single partner in connection with the business were
legally binding on all partners.66 Unless the partners specified otherwise in a
formal partnership agreement, the agreement would be assumed to be 
at will.67
This meant that any partner could terminate the relationship, and thereby force
dissolution of the assets of the business, at any time and for any reason.68 The
62. Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425,428 (1987);
see also 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 1 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1828) (noting
that the law of partnerships "has also been cultivated and greatly enlarged, under a course of judicial
decisions, until the law of partnership has at last attained the precision of a regular branch of science, and
forms a distinguished part of the code of commercial jurisprudence"). This will be important later because,
by contrast, the law governing joint stock companies and corporations was very much undeveloped at the
time.
63. Kent stresses that it was the "communion of profit" that makes an agreement among individuals
to work together into a "partnership," not the nature of what each contributes. 3 KENT, supra note 62, at 3.
"If one person advances funds, and another furnishes his personal services or skill, in carrying on a trade,
and is to share in the profits, it amounts to a partnership." Id. at 2. This is an early recognition by the law
that contributions of human capital were considered of (potentially) equal value to contributions of finan-
cial capital.
64. In this part, I consider only the rules for standard general partnerships. I will discuss joint stock
associations, which were a type of partnership, infra Part II.A.
65. In the case of real estate and other property held by the partnership, the partners would be
considered "tenants in common" and each would be considered to have a direct interest in the real
estate, in proportion to his or her share in the profits. The law did not regard the partnership as a separate
entity, so land and other assets could not be held in the name of the partnership. 3 KENT, supra note 62, at
14-16.
66. Id. at 17.
67. Id. at 28.
68. Chandler tells us that traditional business enterprises in the early nineteenth century were
generally "short-lived." "They were almost always partnerships which were reconstituted or disbanded at
the death or retirement of a partner ... [or] when one partner decided he wanted to work with another
businessman." VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 8.
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exception was if they had explicitly agreed to continue in the relationship until
a specific time, or until specified conditions were met (such as the completion of
a particular project or venture). 9 A partnership would also be automatically
dissolved if a partner died, became insane, or went bankrupt.0 Although there
were no legal limits on the number of individuals that could become partners,
under a classic general partnership arrangement of the time, each individual
partner had full authority to bind the other partners contractually, and all were,
individually and collectively, responsible for the obligations of the business.7 ' So
business people had to be quite selective in choosing partners. A third party who
sued a partnership was required to name all of the partners individually in the
complaint. Partners, meanwhile, could not sue the partnership (to do so would
be to sue themselves), and the partnership could not sue an individual partner
(for the same reason).72
Being a partner in a joint business rather than an employee of an individ-
ual proprietor would in some ways improve the protection each team member
has in the relationship, and would probably improve his or her incentives to do
a good job." Because all would jointly own the assets of the business and have
69. 3 KENT, supra note 62, at 29; see also EDWARD H. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES
WITHOUT INODRPORATION 18 (1929) ("[Elven if the partnership is not at will, the weight of authority in
this country is that any partner may dissolve it at any time."). Premature dissolution was treated as a breach
of contract, however, so that the breaching party might be held liable for damages. Id. at 18 n.1.
70. 3 KENT, supra note 62, at 30-33. One reason why the personal bankruptcy of one of the
partners would compel dissolution of the partnership is that the creditors of the bankrupt partner would
have a claim against partnership assets to pay the debts owed by the bankrupt partner. Id. at 33-34.
71. Id. at 10. Although partnership assets were not clearly protected from seizure by creditors of
the individual partners, partnership assets could not be seized to pay a bankrupt partner's debts until all the
partner's personal assets had been seized, and all the debts of the partnership had been paid. Id. Hansmann,
Kraakman, and Squire note that this gave partnerships partial or weak "affirmative asset partitioning."
Hansmann et al., supra note 5, at 3. Because they define "entity" status by whether an organization has any
affirmative asset partitioning, they regard partnerships as entities. Id. at 8. But as will be discussed in more
detail infra notes 116-128 and accompanying text, courts in the early nineteenth century did not recognize
partnerships as separate entities for the purpose of holding property. In fact, partnership law in the United
States did not unequivocally recognize ordinary general partnerships as separate entities for the purpose
of holding property until the late twentieth century, under the terms of the 1997 Revised Uniform
Partnership Act. Its predecessor, the 1914 Uniform Partnership Act left this question ambiguous. See
REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP AcT § 201 (2003).
72. An interesting exception relevant to this Article is that courts appear to have recognized the
right of a joint stock association, which is considered in Part II, to sue its members to compel them to pay in
their original pledges. See WARREN, supra note 69, at 350, and the discussion infra Part II.
73. Lamoreaux has argued that partners in a firm are less vulnerable to hold-up problems than
employees. See Lamoreaux, supra note 46, at 18. She explains:
Partnerships offer greater protection against hold-up than ordinary contracts, because if one
partner tries to extort income from another, the aggrieved party can threaten to dissolve the
enterprise and force the exploiter either to buy him out or to bear proportionately the costs of
liquidating firm-specific assets. The ability to exit thus provides an incentive for partners to
resolve their differences in a mutually satisfactory way.
Id. The threat to dissolve the partnership is obviously not costless, but could be used in extreme situations.
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an enforceable legal claim to a pro rata share of the profits, each would there-
fore have increased incentives to make appropriate investments in improving
the business. Each would have legal access to all the business records, which
could help them to monitor their partners to ensure the others were not shirk-
ing."4 And, if one of them felt he was not getting his fair share, he could threaten
to dissolve the relationship in order to force the previously agreed-upon sharing
of the proceeds." Finally, because each partner would have been jointly liable
for contract and tort claims against the partnership, each will also have an
incentive to be careful in his business relationships with subcontractors,
suppliers, and customers.
Decisionmaking in partnerships can be unwieldy, however. Because
partners have the legal authority to bind each other in contracts with outsiders,
partnership law requires that all partners approve before new partners can be
admitted, or major transactions or sales of property undertaken.76
Partnership thus grants considerable power and control rights to individual
team members who are partners. In some ways, this protects each team member
against unfair expropriation of the benefits of team production and provides
positive incentives for all partners. But in other ways, partnership also allows
individual team members to use their control rights to hold up the other team
members, and it enhances their mutual ability to engage in wasteful "rent-
seeking" activities.77 With additional partners, this risk is increased relative to
74. Ex ante agreements about the division of rents could lead partners to shirk their duties, how-
ever, if they believe the team will earn rents without their contribution and that they will get their pro rata
share of those rents in any case. For this reason, Bengt Holmstrom suggests that a solution to the team
production problem might be to arrange for an outsider to receive all the rents generated by the team if
the rents fall below some specified minimum level that would only be reached if no one shirked. Only if
the rents exceeded that minimum would team members get any of them. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral
Hazard in Teams, 13 BELLJ. ECON. 324 (1982). This is a solution rarely seen in practice, at least not in
explicit form. Stout and I suggest, however, that placing the assets in a separate legal entity might serve as
an alternative version of this solution to this problem. See Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 269.
75. See Lamoreaux, supra note 46, at 18.
76. Clifford Holdemess argues that aggregate ownership arrangements such as partnerships impede
the "alienability" of property relative to individual ownership, and relative to ownership by a separate
entity. See Clifford G. Holdemess, Joint Owership and Alienability, 23 INTL REV. L & E(C)N. 75, 83-84
(2003).
77. In a contemporary example of the importance of the hold-up problem to the organizational
design of businesses, D. Gordon Smith describes the vulnerability of entrepreneurs to venture capitalists
and vice versa over the question of when and on what terms the other party can exit. D. Gordon Smith,
Control Over Ext in Venture Capita Reaionships, (June 5, 2001), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so3/
delivery.cfmnSSRNID272231 _codeO10604600.pdf?abstractid=272231#PaperDownload. Smith notes
that "neither an entrepreneur nor a venture capitalist would be willing to enter a relationship in which the
other had unconstrained power over the exit decision.... ." Id. at 6. Holger Muller and Karl Warneryd
discuss these problems with partnerships, and suggest that the corporate form makes possible "outside
ownership," which they argue can reduce the costs associated with these problems under some circum-
stances. See Holger M. Miller & Karl Warneryd, Inside Versus Outside Ownersh: A Political Theory of the
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the incentive benefits that partnerships provide. Partnership is thus likely to
provide a solution to the team production problem only in certain restricted
situations: where the number of team members is small, and/or the personal,
professional, family, or community ties are relatively strong."
We must also consider the advantages and disadvantages of the partnership
form in dealing with third parties such as subcontractors, suppliers, and custom-
ers. Third parties who enter into explicit contracts with partners may be some-
what protected by full and unlimited liability bearing upon all the partners.79 But
such protection does not itself encourage partners to make relationship-specific
investments. To make such investments, outsiders would want to be assured that
the business is reliable and sustainable. In a partnership, such credibility would
depend not only on the good health, good fortune, and reputation of a single
individual (as in an individual proprietorship), but on the health, fortune, and
reputation of every partner, as well as their ability to continue cooperating. This
is because any partner can encumber assets of the business or can exit at any
time, thus forcing a dissolution or restructuring of the business. Although
creditors of the partnership would have priority in any dissolution and winding
up of the partnership business, neither outsiders nor even the individual partners
themselves could ensure that the business itself would be continued.
Thus, while a few individuals known to each other and their communities
might be able to sustain a modest-sized manufacturing, trading, or other busi-
ness for a while as a partnership, the implicit veto power that partnership rules
give to each partner, and the vulnerability of the pool of bonding assets to the
fortunes, talents, and good behavior of every partner would likely become prob-
lematic as the business grew. Participants in a large network of business
Firm, 32 RANDJ. ECON. 527 (2001). The rationale for their argument is somewhat different from the one
laid out in this Article, however.
78. See CHARLES R. T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BusINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 56 (3d ed. 1999) ('The archetypical general part-
nership, for which general partnership laws default and immutable rules are ideal, is a small, intimate firm
in which each partner participates in all aspects of the business and has substantial confidence in the
trustworthiness and skill of fellow partners."). O'Kelley and Thompson also suggest that "general
partnership law norms will be most efficient if partners make similar contributions of services and capital."
Id. at 57. Howard Bodenhom presents evidence that partnerships in the early nineteenth century generally
involved individuals of similar age, experience, and means, and that partners were required to make
substantial contributions of human, physical, and financial capital to the partnership, which he argues
functioned to bond their promises not to act opportunistically. HOwARD BODENHORN, PARTNERSHIP
AND HOLD-UP IN EARLY AMERICA (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8814, 2002),
av idabLe at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8814.
79. "Limited partnerships," under which certain passive partners might be protected from personal
liability, were authorized by statute in New York in 1822, and other states later followed New York's lead.
WARREN, supra note 69, at 302. But even in limited partnerships, some subset of the partners must be
designated as general partners and bear full liability. Id. at 302-03. It wasn't until late in the twentieth
century that state laws began to provide for limited liability partnerships (in which all partners have limited
liability) as a standard organizational form.
412
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relationships-in which mutual success depends on numerous individuals
making team-specific investments over a sustained period of time-require some
assurance of continuity and financial stability. Partnership appears to be a poor
vehicle for providing such continuity and stability.'s Partnership can thus help to
amass capital, but this organizational form does not provide for centralized
control, and cannot facilitate the commitment of capital for extended periods
of time.
II. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES AND CORPORATIONS
The central hypothesis of this Article is that demand for the corporate form
surged in the mid-nineteenth century United States because this form uniquely
facilitated the establishment of lasting enterprises that could accumulate
substantial enterprise-specific physical assets, and form extensive specialized
organizational structures. It is difficult to pinpoint any particular point in time in
which "modem" incorporation law-especially entity status and separate
governance-became freely available to business organizers. This is because
modern rules for formation and governance of contemporary corporations
evolved over many years as state legislatures passed statutes that expanded the
purposes for which corporate status would be granted and the terms under which
they could be organized. But it is clear from the historical record that as early as
the late eighteenth century, business people were trying to find legal ways to
assemble assets and people in a way to allow the organizations to survive and
grow. Quite simply, they began trying to build lasting business institutions.
Those early efforts took two paths: the unincorporated joint stock company
and the specially chartered corporation. Joint stock companies were devised
using partnership law, supplemented by trust law, to create organizations with
many of the characteristics of corporations that business people wanted, but with-
out the necessity of obtaining a special charter from the legislatures. Meanwhile,
state legislatures were gradually granting corporate charters to more people, for
more purposes. Once corporate charters were freely available, the benefits of the
corporate form relative to the joint stock company-the most important being
the unquestioned legal status of chartered corporations as separate juridical
persons--caused the use of the latter to die out.
80. Chandler tells us that partnerships were the dominant way to organize business activities prior
to the 1840s. See VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 36. But apparently this form was not adequate as
business enterprises began expanding significantly in the 1850s. The "limited partnership" form, available
under some state statutes, solved some of the asset partitioning problems because limited partners could not
withdraw their capital for the duration of the partnership, and were protected from personal liability. See,
e.g., SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 97. Active partners were also not supposed to withdraw their capital for the
duration specified in the partnership agreement, but, as noted above, courts of equity probably would have
upheld their right to withdraw at will, but would have made them liable for damages.
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This part reviews the historical development of the law, explaining the
parallel development of joint stock companies and corporations, and the legal
differences between them. Then in the next part, I discuss the historical devel-
opment of the corporate law that the corporation was a separate legal entity, and
show how entity status and separate governance helped to solve team production
problems in a number of early corporations.
A. Joint Stock Companies
Although most business historians agree that partnerships and individual
proprietorships were the most common way that business enterprises were
organized in the United States until well into the nineteenth century, char-
tered joint stock companies were being organized in Europe to undertake trade
missions as early as the early seventeenth century." In the earliest joint stock
companies," a group of merchants would pool their "stocks" (the goods they
had for trade), and collectively hire a ship to undertake a trade mission. The
charters that these groups had been granted by their respective kings gave them
monopolies over rights to trade, as well as the rights to establish colonies, in
certain parts of the world. The companies' ships would embark on their trade
missions, and when they returned, the stock of goods acquired in trade would
be divided among the merchants and the "company" dissolved, to be reformed
for the next trade mission. Later, some chartered companies decided to quit
dividing up the proceeds at the end of each trade mission, and, instead commit-
ted their initial capital for an extended period. In 1623, the Dutch East India
Company was granted the right of perpetual existence.83 Under this new
arrangement, the company members would no longer be able to demand repay-
ment at the end of each voyage (this marked the beginning of the "resource
commitment" feature of joint stock companies), but they could, instead, sell their
"shares" in the company." In 1654, the British East India Company also adopted
a rule of perpetual existence, accompanied by full transferability of shares."
Many similar organizations were established in Britain and throughout Europe,
demonstrating the principle that business people could establish permanent
organizations involving a relatively large and changing number of people with
fixed capital and separate management.
81. Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire provide a detailed history of this development. Hansmann
et al., supra note 5.
82. The British East India Company was chartered in 1600; the Dutch East India Company was
chartered in 1602. Id. at 43.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 44.
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During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, entrepreneurs
pursuing other kinds of businesses-especially banking and insurance-sought
charters to organize themselves in this way. In fact, the demand for charters in
England outstripped the willingness of Parliament to grant them. 6 As a result,
a number of "companies" copied the organizational form and began selling
shares, despite not receiving special charters. Financial markets developed
rapidly to foster trading in the shares of these companies. In 1720, however, a
financial market boom in England ended suddenly and disastrously. In response
to the associated scandals, Parliament passed an act that, though vague in its
wording, appeared to make it illegal to sell shares in unchartered joint stock
companies. 7 This act slowed the development of this organizational form in
England for more than one hundred years, until the so-called "Bubble Act" was
repealed in 1825.88
Early American settlers would have been familiar with the joint stock
company form, because at least one such company, the Hudson's Bay Company,
was chartered to trade in parts of the colonies. A few joint stock companies
were formed in the colonies before the American Revolution.89 And of course,
after the Revolution, no one questioned the authority of the states to grant
charters. But they apparently did so sparingly, with one source estimating that
only 335 charters for business corporations had been issued in the United States
by 1800.90
86. Id.
87. The Bubble Act of 1720 made it illegal to "presum[e] to act as a corporate Body" without a
royal charter, or "to raise a transferable Stock or Stocks." Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An
Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873,887 (2000) (citing ARMAND B. DUBOIS, THE
ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT, 1720-1800, at 41 (1938)).
88. Ron Harris, The Bubble Act: Its Passage and Its Effects on Business Organization, 54 J. ECXDN. HIST.
610 (1994) (providing a review of the conventional wisdom about the depressing effect of the Bubble
Act, and then offering an alternative interpretation of its purpose and effect). England did not clean up
the confusion and pass a general incorporation act that clearly permitted business people to organ-
ize themselves into companies and receive a charter simply by registering until the passage of the English
Companies Act of 1844 made incorporation more widely available. See Mahoney, supra note 87, at 889
(citing An Act for the Registration, Incorporation, and Regulation of Joint Stock Companies, 1844, 7
& 8 Vict., c. 110 (Eng.)); see also Bishop C. Hunt, The Joint-Stock Company in England, 1830-1844, 43 J.
POL. ECON. 331 (1935).
89. Livermore describes some unincorporated joint stock companies organized for the purpose of
land settlement and speculation, that came into existence as early as 1748. See LIVERMORE, supra note
4, at 75-80. Kent notes that several chartered corporations existing in nineteenth century America "owed
their origin to the crown, under the colony administration." 3 KENT, supra note 62, at 223. Hurst notes
that English-chartered companies were prominent in establishing the colonies, and that, once established,
the royal governors of the colonies themselves chartered some business corporations. HURST, supra note 4,
at 7-15.
90. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 24 tbl.l. Davis also provides evidence that there were quite a few
unincorporated joint stock companies in existence in 1800.
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Just as happened in England, however, business people tried to achieve
the benefits of corporate status for themselves in the United States through
private contracts, and without seeking a charter from the state legislatures.9'
The organizations they formed were technically partnerships in which partners
agreed to place the assets used in the business into a trust controlled by a group of
trustees,92 and then sell transferable claims on distributions from that trust. In
this way, the promoters were able to achieve resource commitment (assets stayed
in the trust, even as individual investors came and went) with some separation of
control. One historian tells us that land promoters formed so-called "business
trusts" in this fashion to market land in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, for example.93 The Lehigh Coal Mine Company that we met in Part
I was an example of such an association, as was the Lehigh Navigation Company
formed by White, Hazard, and Hauto.
A History of the Lehigh Navigation Company gives us some idea of how these
organizations worked in practice. At the formation of the Company in 1818, the
promoters sought out subscribers, conditioning the commitment of the invest-
ment funds on the findings of a committee that they formed of "two of our most
respectable citizens," 94 who were sent to examine the actual condition of the
Lehigh River and surrounding lands. According to the History: "They both came
to the conclusion, and so reported, that the improvement of the navigation was
perfectly practicable, and that it would not exceed the cost of fifty thousand
dollars, as estimated, but that the making of a good road to the mines was utterly
impossible."95
At this point, the History tells us, the Lehigh promoters split into two
groups, one which thought the coal business would prove profitable, but had
doubts about the potential of the navigation business, and one which thought
the river improvement project would be feasible and profitable, but had doubts
about the coal mining aspect of the venture. The Lehigh Navigation Company
91. See, e.g., SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 63 (noting that early New England mills organized as joint
stock companies for which contract agreements "specified most of the powers of corporations except the
two key ones, perpetual existence and a single legal entity," which "could only be granted by the state").
Hugh Sowards and James Mofsky note that there is no record of how many unchartered joint stock
companies may have been formed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, precisely because
such organizations were not granted charters, nor were they otherwise registered. Hugh L. Sowards &
James S. Mofsky, Factors Affecting de Development of Corporation Law, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 476, 481
(1969) (discussing firms that did not seek special grants, but were organized to achieve some of the benefits
of the corporate form); see also WILLIAM R. BAGNALL, THE TEXTILE INDUSTRIES OF THE UNITED STATES
(1893) (indicating that unincorporated joint stock companies were not infrequently used to organize firms
in the textile business prior to 1813). See generally LIVERMORE, supra note 4 (describing joint stock
companies used in land speculation).
92. The documents which set up these trusts were sometimes called "deeds of settlement."
93. LIVERMORE, supra note 4.
94. A HISTORY OF THE LEHIGH COAL AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, supra note 32, at 8.
95. Id.
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then proceeded to raise $50,000 from investors "on the terms that those who
furnished the money should have all the profits accruing from the navigation
up to twenty-five per cent, all profits beyond that to go to White, Hauto and
Hazard, who also retained the exclusive management of the concern.",96 Later, in
October 1818, a new association was formed, called Lehigh Coal Company, "for
the purpose of making a road from the river to the mines, and of bringing coal to
market by the new navigation."97  Another $55,000 was subscribed to this
Company, on terms similar to that of the Navigation Company, except that the
subscribers were to get the first 20 percent, and the profits beyond that would go
to the managers, "they conveying the lease of the coal mine company's land, and
also several other tracts of land which they had purchased, to trustees for the
benefit of the association."98
Work by the Coal Company proceeded rapidly, and they finished a passable
road to the mines by 1819. But work on the river navigation proved more diffi-
cult than expected, when it turned out that the water fell in the river during the
dry season to a point twelve inches lower than the promoters had expected to be
the seasonally lowest point. The Navigation Company had to construct a series
of locks to ensure that the river could be passable at all seasons of the year,99
and more money had to be raised. A "difficulty arose" among the managers, the
History notes, and White and Hazard agreed to buy out Hauto's interest in the
Company."° Then in the Spring of 1820, the managers arranged to "amalga-
mate" the two companies to form the Lehigh Navigation and Coal Company,
provided they could raise another $20,000. '0 Once the extra funds were
raised, the remaining work was completed on the river, and the Company
brought 365 tons of coal to Philadelphia. Unfortunately, the market in
Philadelphia could not, at that time, absorb that much anthracite coal, prices
collapsed, and the Company failed to make any money.02
By this time, existing subscribers were losing faith, but one of the managers
loaned the company some funds to keep it going, and the company was reor-
ganized one more time, as The Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company. The
capital stock was increased again through new subscriptions, and, to encourage
the new investors, White and Hazard agreed to release to the company all "their
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id.
98. Id. It is not clear from the Histosy what was meant by the expressions "profits up to twenty-five
percent," or "profits above twenty per cent." It seems unrealistic to imagine that the investors expected to
make an annual return on invested capital of at least 20 percent or 25 percent.
99. These locks utilized a unique sluice gate design created by White, according to the History. Id.
at 10.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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reserved exclusive rights and privileges, and residuary profits, and convey to trus-
tees, for the use of the company, all their right to the water-power of the river
Lehigh, and come in as simple stockholders." ' 3 New subscribers, moreover,
were given a preference in any dividend payments up to 3 percent semi-
annually, original stockholders were then to get payments up to 3 percent
semiannually, and "finally, any excess profit beyond these was to go to the
stock allotted to J. White and E. Hazard" until they had received a 3 percent
semiannual dividend.' 4 Once those levels were met, "all discrimination in the
stock was to cease, and all the owners to come in for an equal share of the
profits in the proportion of shares of stock held by them."'05 Finally, the History
tells us that in this last reorganization, Hazard and White created something
like a board of managers who would jointly control the enterprise, to consist of
five individuals.
0 6
The history of this particular unincorporated joint stock company provides
a rich insight into all the hazards of a team production project. Before the
partners could raise any outside money, they had to get a feasibility opinion from
trusted third parties. Then some aspects of the venture went according to plan,
while others did not. Initial agreements had to be reworked as the project pro-
ceeded. At each point, there were undoubtedly opportunities for various
participants to disagree, and/or to behave opportunistically. We hear the story
from the board of managers of the company that ultimately survived, so pre-
sumably it is a version favoring White and Hazard. But it seems likely that the
first round of subscribers were upset by the fact that the job could not be com-
pleted according to the original plan, and that they therefore had to give the next
round of subscribers a preference in any subsequent dividend payments to entice
them in.
It is also interesting that White and Hazard had to buy out Hauto, illus-
trating one of the potential problems with this modified partnership form: Any
partner could withdraw at will and either force dissolution, or compel the
remaining partners to buy out his interest. We don't know from the undoubt-
edly glossed-over history produced by the board of managers two decades later
whether there were lawsuits and recriminations associated with these rough peri-
ods, but it is easy to imagine that there might have been. In any case, we can see
that White and Hazard had a difficult time getting enough investment capital,
and keeping it in the enterprise.
103. Id. at 12.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 12-13.
106. Id. at 13. It is unclear from the record in the official company History whether Hazard and
White were among the five members of the managing board, but it seems likely from other details that they
probably were.
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It is also probably significant that in the final reorganization, White and
Hazard had to turn over control of all the relevant rights and properties to a
trust, and create a board of managers, on which they could be outvoted, to
oversee the operations of the enterprise. Lynn Stout and I have argued that the
delegation of control rights to a board may help to solve the team production
problem because it helps to convince all the parties that none of them can
unilaterally make decisions that enrich themselves at the expense of others,
and that decisionmaking is more likely to be "fair."'' 7 White and Hazard could
by this device, for example, more credibly promise investors that decisions
would be carefully considered by at least three other managers (assuming White
and Hazard were themselves on the board).
Legal historians tell us that the articles of association of firms like the
Lehigh associations became increasingly sophisticated during the period from
1760 until the states began, slowly at first, passing general incorporation acts
after about 1810. '08 As such, these associations began to assume more of the
structural and governance characteristics of modem corporations. But legal
historians also tell us that these "proto-corporations" were regarded by courts as
a species of partnership.' 9 That probably meant, among other things, that
members or "shareholders" in these organizations would not be granted limited
liability. It also meant that investors in these "companies" were deemed to
hold pro rata interests in the property of the business-the "companies" were
not regarded as separate legal entities for the purpose of holding property."
107. Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 276 (discussing the formation of a corporation and a board of
directors as instituting a "decisionmaking procedure in place that all believe will be fair").
108. See, e.g., Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 91, at 481. These authors claim that the provisions
of the earliest general incorporation acts by state legislatures were very similar to the provisions of some
of the more sophisticated articles of association of unincorporated joint stock companies. Massachusetts
passed an act making it easier for textile mills to incorporate in 1809; and New York passed an act
extending the privilege of easy incorporation to a number of different manufacturing businesses in 1811.
See SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 65; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
195 (2d ed. 1985). See the discussion of the emergence of corporate law, infra Part III.
109. See WARREN, supra note 69, at 327-28 (noting that joint stock companies were a "species of
partnership"); see also SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 47 (referring to joint stock companies as "expanded
partnerships"); Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, The Myth of the Corporation as a Creation of the
State, 3 INT'L REV. L EcoN. 107, 110 (1983) ("-lhe unincorporated joint-stock firm was a 'step-child of
the law,' leaving 'serious legal difficulties to surmount.' Technically, they were subject to partnership
law...." (quoting A. DUBOiS, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFrER THE BUBBLE ACT, 1720-
1800, at 217 (1971))); Mahoney, supra note 87, at 888 ("By the time of the Bubble Act's repeal in 1825,
judges, having had nothing to do with unincorporated joint stock companies for a century, were deter-
mined to fit them into an existing legal category (for example, partnership) rather than see them as a
different form of contract altogether.").
110. See Paddy Ireland, Capitalism Without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company Share and the Emer-
gence of the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality, 17 LEGAL HIST. 41, 44 n.13 (1996) (citing
WILLIAM WATSON, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 3-5 (2d ed. 1807)). Paddy Ireland traces
the history of court cases in England, demonstrating that prior to about 1837, courts consistently found that
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This legal treatment created complications when a member died and tried to
will his shares to his heirs, as I discuss at greater length below.
The Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company was concerned with issues such
as these as it attempted to raise one more round of financing in 1821. Indeed,
White and Hazard went back to the Pennsylvania legislature to ask that it pass
an act of incorporation, to transform the unincorporated enterprise into a
corporation.11' The firm was incorporated by a special act of the Pennsylvania
Legislature on February 13, 1822.12
Such requests were sometimes politically controversial; a public debate
about a similar request to incorporate a coal mining company took place just one
year later."' In a pamphlet published in 1823 by seven business people attempt-
ing to organize the Schuylkill Coal Company,"' the promoters listed three
reasons why they wanted to be incorporated, rather than attempt to operate as a
partnership, or as an unincorporated joint stock company:
1. To have the real estate of the Company, consisting of the coal lands
which they hold, and such limited additional quantity as they may be
allowed to acquire, with the necessary and appropriate improvements for
the working of the mines, exempted from the laws of succession or inheri-
tance, which govern the cases of natural persons or individuals. 2d. That
the Company should be exempted from the ordinary laws of partnership,
so far as they subject the estates of the several individuals who compose
the Company to all the liabilities of the Association. 3d. To be recognized
in law by a corporate name, and to be perpetuated, notwithstanding the
shareholders in joint stock companies, whether incorporated or not, had a direct property interest in the
assets of the firm. Id. at 49-50. Ireland states:
In Howse v. Chapman, for example, decided in 1799, a share in the incorporated Bath Navigation
Company was held to be real estate and within the Statute of Mortmain because the property
belonging to the Company was itself in part realty .... That this was also the prevailing view of
shares in unincorporated joint stock companies is clear from cases such as Buckridge v. Ingram
(1795), which concerned the unincorporated Avon Navigation.
Id.
111. AN ACT TO INCORPORATE THE LEHIGH COAL AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, reprinted in
ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA CONCERNING THE LEHIGH COAL AND
NAVIGATION COMPANY 20 (1837) [hereinafter ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY] (noting that one
of the reasons the company wanted to incorporate was that "this company is desirous of completing as
speedily as possible the improvement of the navigation of the river Lehigh... but require[s] additional
funds, and experience[s] great difficulty in procuring the necessary subscriptions to their stock on
account of the unincorporated character of the association").
112. Id. at 29.
113. A number of the pamphlets from several subsequent debates about incorporation of other coal
companies, as well as one about whether the Lehigh company was overcharging for access to the river, are
in the collection at the Hagley Library. It is from these that the following account is constructed.
114. MANUEL EYRE ET AL., REMARKS AND OBSERVATIONS SHOWING THE JUSTICE AND POLICY
OF INCORPORATING "THE SCHUYLKILL COAL COMPANY" 1-8 (Philadelphia 1823). This pamphlet is in
the collection of the Hagley Library.
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demise or change of the members who may at any given time compose the
Company."
5
In other words, the group wanted the benefits of limited liability along with
the convenience of being able to operate under a corporate name. But their first
concern was that if a court treated the association as a partnership, it could prove
impossible to keep the assets of the enterprise together for use in the enterprise,
including protecting them from being broken up by the heirs of the partners.
6
"If one of the partners die," the pamphlet says, "his undivided interest will
descend by inheritance, or pass by devise to his heirs, who may consist of numer-
ous children, in infancy, or numerous collateral relations, widely spread, and diffi-
cult of recognition.' 17 If this happened:
The operations of the Company must, on this event, immediately cease,
and the joint estate be sold for division, or be otherwise divided between
the survivors and the heirs of the deceased member, according to the
decree of a proper legal tribunal, perhaps after a tedious suit, involving
intricate questions of partnership claims, accounts, and 
settlements." 8
These promoters were clearly aware that they could use trust law to protect
the assets of the enterprise from creditors, heirs, or partners wanting to withdraw.
But they were not confident that organization as an unincorporated joint stock
company, and the use of the business trust, would provide adequate protection:
Some of these difficulties may indeed be avoided by complicated trusts,
covenants, and stipulations; but these, plain men of business cannot
themselves frame, nor without difficulty understand; and when framed
under the advice of the best legal abilities, they are subject nevertheless, to
various constructions, and end but too frequently in vexatious and
injurious controversies, which prudent men will anxiously avoid."'
The group's concerns were probably not unfounded. James Kent, in his
Commentaries on American Law published in 1826, includes a lengthy discus-
sion of corporations,' and a separate lengthy discussion 
of partnerships.'2'
Within the partnership section, he makes passing reference to partnerships that
115. Id. at 1.
116. Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire stress the importance of entity status for protecting the
assets of the enterprise from creditors of the members of the association, but the promoters of this coal-
mining company do not mention any concern about the creditors of members. See Hansmann et al., supra
note 5; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5. Their concern is about the rights of heirs to company
property if the group is organized as a partnership rather than a corporation.
117. EYREETAL., supra note 114, at 1.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2.
120. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 215-53 (Da Capo Press 1971)
(1828).
121. 3 KENT, supra note 62, at 1-42.
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"consist of a large unincorporated association,"1"' noting that those are usually
governed by the special terms of the agreement that established them, but that,
regardless of what was in their articles of association, "the established law of the
land in reference to such partnerships, is the same as in ordinary cases." ' The
cases Kent cites for support of this proposition are all British cases. 24
To the extent that U.S. courts in the early nineteenth century were
looking to Britain for precedent about the legal status of such organizations, the
promoters would have had even more to worry about. In the second edition of
William Watson's treatise on partnerships, published in 1807, he emphasized
the legal distinction between joint stock companies that were incorporated,
and those that were not. He explained that joint stock companies "not con-
firmed by public authority" were mere partnerships."2 In several English cases
cited by Paddy Ireland until about 1837,126 the courts regarded the "sharehold-
ers" of both incorporated as well as unincorporated companies as having a direct
joint interest in the property of the company, rather than as owning shares in a
company, which in turn owned the property."'
In the United States, meanwhile, it appears that the distinction drawn by
the courts was based on whether the company had a charter or not. Corpora-
tions were regarded as separate entities for purposes of holding property. But
there was considerable uncertainty about whether U.S. courts would regard
unincorporated joint stock companies as separate entities. And U.S. courts did
not clearly affirm the notion that shares in unincorporated joint stock companies
could be freely traded until 1827.128
Thus the lack of clear entity status under the law for unincorporated joint




125. WATSON, supra note 110, at 3.
126. Ireland, supra note 110, at 49-50.
127. Id. at 49. Ireland analyzed early joint stock companies, and noted that "[tlo own 'a share' in
a company implied ownership of a share of the totality of the company's assets .... Shareholders were
regarded as owners in equity of the company's property and shares as an equitable right to an undivided part
of the company's assets."
128. See Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 91, at 482 (citing Alvord v. Smith, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 232
(1827)). Several legal scholars have argued that, if the courts had recognized joint stock companies as
separate legal entities for purposes of holding property, then it would not have been necessary for companies
to be chartered by the states for business people to construct contracts that gave them the benefits we
associate with incorporation. See Anderson & Tollison, supra note 109; Mahoney, supra note 87. But
courts in the United States did not go in this direction. Hence charters were necessary for the full benefits
of corporate status to be achieved. It is not my purpose here to debate whether corporate law should have
been developed as a common law extension of contract, partnership, and trust law, with the courts
affirming and supporting private business people as they developed new types of organizational contracts, or
whether courts were correct not to sanction a new organizational form without legislative authorization.
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large amounts of physical and organizational assets. We turn next to the history
of the emergence of corporate law to see why.
III. THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE LAW
A. Corporations as Separate Entities
The earliest incorporated entities in the United States were either (1)
chartered trading companies that had received their charter from the English
king before the Revolution, (2) eleemosynary institutions, municipalities, or
chartered banks and insurance companies, or (3) corporations chartered to carry
out some public works project, such as to build a road or bridge or canal, or pro-
vide a supply of water to some municipality.'29 In 1826, Kent traced the history
of corporations to Roman law,1"' noting that, under English law, corporations
were either "ecclesiastical" or "lay." Ecclesiastical corporations were religious
societies that incorporated in order to provide a mechanism for holding property
over time, as individual members came and went.' Lay corporations "[welre
again divided into eleemosynary and civil," he observed.'32 Eleemosynary corpo-
rations included hospitals, colleges and universities, and corporations organized
to provide charitable services to the indigent. Civil corporations, he continued
"[weire either public or private."'3 By public corporations Kent meant entities
that existed for "public political purposes, such as counties, cities, towns and
villages."'34
In all of these categories of corporations except private corporations, the
primary purpose for incorporating is to provide a mechanism for holding property
for some public, charitable, educational, or religious use, so that such property
would not be owned by the individuals managing the institution or making
decisions about the use of the property. Because the property held by an incor-
porated entity was not owned by natural persons, it could not be passed to the
heirs of such persons but would continue to be the property of the institution,
even as its "managers" (mayors, bishops, or presidents, for example) came and
129. See LIVERMORE, supra note 4, at 9-36 (describing "precedent forms of association"); see aLso
VOTAW, supra note 3, at 19 ("The concept of persona ficta did not begin with commercial associations but
with religious, educational, and municipal associations."). Seavoy notes that Blackstone did not clearly
distinguish "between municipal corporations, benevolent public service corporations, and business
corporations" in his eighteenth century treatise on English law. SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 46; see 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs 468.
130. 2 KENT, supra note 120, at 217 ("mhe principles of law applicable to corporations under
[English law] were borrowed chiefly from the Roman law.").
131. Id. at 221-22.
132. Id. at 222.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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went.' 35 It is conceptually easy to understand how and why the law would have
regarded such institutions as legally separate from whoever managed them at any
time, or whoever contributed the funding to acquire their assets.136 And it is with
respect to these types of corporations that the law developed the concept of a
separate legal "person" or entity."'
The final category of corporations that Kent recognized were private cor-
porations. Of Kent's categories, private corporations were the only ones that
might engage in strictly commercial activity, although in the late eighteenth
century even corporations in this category were expected to provide some needed
service.'38 After the American Revolution, the new American states tentatively
began granting corporate charters to business promoters to establish banks, build
turnpikes, or provide other needed services. Such businesses usually required a
charter to create the separate legal entity and associated governance structure,
along with some special privilege or power from the state to carry out their
business, such as the right to issue notes that could serve as currency, or the right-
of-way through public lands.'3 9 Because of the special nature of the businesses
that were granted corporate status, it was important that the business property be
held separately from the personal property of the individual business promoters,
and that the business property be protected from subdivision or seizure.'40 Hence
135. See HURSr, supra note 4, at 16 ("[Rleligious or welfare institutions existed to serve indefinite
constituencies.").
136. See 2 KENT, supra note 120, at 216 ("It was chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men in
succession, with the qualities and capacities of one single, artificial, and fictitious being, that corporations
were originally invented.").
137. Michael Whincop says the notion of a corporation as an artificial "person" is obviously a meta-
phor, but one that was convenient legally because it helped judges to think about what rights and
obligations the corporation should have in particular situations. MICHAEL J. WHINCOP, AN ECONOMIC
AND JURISPRUDENTIAL GENEALOGY OFCORIoRATE LAw 45-50 (2001).
138. It was considered an inappropriate use of legislative power to grant corporate status for purposes
that were not regarded as in the public interest. See, e.g., Currie's Adm'rs v. Mut. Assurance Soc'y, 14 Va.
(4 Hen. & M.) 315,347-48 (Va. 1809). The court asserted:
It may be often convenient for a set of associated individuals, to have the privileges of a corpora-
tion bestowed upon them; but if their object is merely private or selfish; if it is detrimental to, or
not promotive of, the public good, they have no adequate claim upon the legislature for the
privilege.
Id.; JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE 7 (1 lth ed. 1832) ("mhe design of a corporation is to provide for some good that is useful to
the public."); see also D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 292-96 (1998).
139. Hurst discusses the controversies over the legitimacy of corporations in the nineteenth century,
and attributes some of the concern about corporations in general to "the contemporary failure to distinguish
between the franchise to act as a corporate entity in law and franchises to engage in particular substantive
lines of business or to enjoy particular privileges or immunities of substantive business action under law."
HURST, supra note 4, at 22.
140. SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 4. Seavoy notes:
Whe New York legislature readily granted incorporation to businesses that had not existed in the
colonial economy. Incorporation of business enterprises... helped protect the collective
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it was in the interest of the state to grant entity status for such businesses. Entity
status could only be granted by individual special charter, however, so each
corporation had to be created by a separate act of the relevant state legislature.1
41
Prior to 1800, only a few such special charters had been granted in each state.
Although state courts later struggled with the implications of entity status
for business corporations in certain situations, and wavered about the extent to
which business corporations should be understood as being similar to, or different
from partnerships,"42 the separateness of the incorporated entity from its members
or participants was rarely at issue. The. whole point of the charter was
separateness.
B. Access to Corporate Status for More Purposes
By the early nineteenth century, states began to grant corporate charters
for a much wider range of business purposes. A growing number of these
corporations were for activities like manufacturing. Such businesses did
not receive any special franchise or monopoly privilege. In 1809, the
Massachusetts legislature passed a general incorporation act for manufacturing
ownership of real property [and] facilitated the mobilization of capital .... The new classes of
incorporated businesses were usually fairly large-scale and they often had a high risk factor.
Id.
141. Presumably the legislatures could have granted entity status to partnerships. See the discussion
of joint stock associations, supra Part II. The New York legislature passed a statute in 1822 providing for
business organizers to establish "limited partnerships" partly to provide for an organizational form that could
substitute for corporations in some cases. See SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 97 (regarding the move as reflecting
"the anti-corporation sentiment of the Convention"). From the legislative point of view, however, the
requirement of special charters for individual corporations gave legislatures more control over the business
activities undertaken by these organizations. This Article does not address the question of why legislatures
insisted on charters, but focuses instead on why business people went to the trouble to obtain them. What
did they achieve by having a special charter that they could not have achieved by contract, through the
partnership form or the joint stock company form, and that was worth the extra trouble?
142. See Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American
Law, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 1441, 1457-65 (1989); see, e.g., Pratt v. Bacon, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 123, 126
(1830) (arguing that the distinction is clear "there is certainly some resemblance between a corporation
and a partnership... [but] the difference between the relative rights and duties, the legal qualities and
characteristics of the members of a manufacturing corporation, and copartners and tenants in common, is
obvious and strongly marked"); see also Colleen A. Dunlavy, From Partners to Plutocrats: 19th-Century
Shareholder Voting Rights and Theories of the Corporation 3 (Mar. 2, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author); Lamoreaux supra note 46, at 21. By contrast, Gray v. Portand Bank, 3 Mass. (1 Tyng) 363
(1807), analogized corporations to partnerships to decide whether one shareholder could be excluded from
a right or privilege granted to the others. The court noted that, at the time of the incident in question in
the case, "all the stockholders were partners." Smith, supra note 138, at 303 n.128 (quoting Gray). Later
courts took the position that they might "pierce the veil" of the separate entity in order to reach through to
the individual persons associated together in the entity only if "the notion of legal entity is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime." See PRESSER, supra note 10, at 1-7
(quoting United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.ED. Wis. 1905)).
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companies.'43 Then in 1811 the legislature of New York passed an act
providing for
any five or more persons who shall be desirous to form a company for the
purpose of manufacturing woolen, cotton or linen goods, or for the purpose
of making glass, or for the purpose of making from ore bar-iron, anchors,
millirons, steel, nail rods, hoop-iron and ironmongery, sheet copper, sheet
lead, shot, white lead and red lead.'
44
The primary motivation for these acts was to encourage domestic production of
goods, and thereby reduce U.S. dependence on British imports.'45 By the 1820s,
when Kent wrote his Commentaries, the demand by business people for corporate
charters was growing rapidly,' 46 and the states were responding by granting such
charters ever more freely. Pennsylvania passed a general incorporation act in
1836,'47 and in 1837, Connecticut passed a bill permitting incorporation for
"any... lawful business.' '48 During the 1840s, six additional states passed general
incorporation statutes. '  By the end of the 1850s, fifteen additional states had
passed general incorporation statutes. Is
Historians have explored the political pressure on state legislatures to pass
general incorporation statutes as arising out of the growing fear and resentment of
a situation in which legislatures could use incorporation rights for political pur-
poses, granting special privileges to some, while withholding them from others.'5'
But historians have devoted little attention to the question of why business
organizers were so eager to have a charter, especially considering that the charter
143. See Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 91, at 483 (citing the Massachusetts Manufacturing
Corporation Act of 1809).
144. Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67, 1811 N.Y. Laws 111.
145. Susan Pace Harmill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst's
Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L REv. 81, 101 (1999) (discussing the rationale for New York's 1811
general incorporation act); see also SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 63-68 (providing more historical detail about
the circumstances leading to the act).
146. Kent expressed dismay at the growth in demand for corporate charters, and what he regarded as
the rather promiscuous granting of them by the New York state legislature, which granted thirty-nine new
corporate charters in 1823. See 2 KENT, supra note 120, at 219-20 ("The demand for acts of incorporation
is continually increasing, and the propensity is the more striking, as it appears to be incurable; and we have
no moral means to resist it .... ).
147. Act of June 16, 1836, ch. 260, 1836 Pa. Laws 746.
148. Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Note, Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit: The Progressive Federal
Incorporation Movement and the Modem Regulatory State, 77 VA. L REV. 603,613 (1991) (citing Act of June
10, 1837, ch. 63, 1837 Con. Pub. Acts 49, 49).
149. Ohio, New Jersey, and Michigan did so in 1846, Iowa in 1847, Louisiana in 1848, and
Wisconsin in 1849. Hamill, supra note 145, at 101-02 n.85.
150. Id. at 102.
151. See, e.g., HURST, supra note 4, at 109-13 (discussing the evolving nineteenth-century consen-
sus leading to the enactment of general incorporation statutes).
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did not come with any special franchise or privilege.'52 This Article suggests that,
as business people tried to expand their operations beyond what a few individuals
could fund, manage, and carry out, they discovered that incorporating and
investing through a separate entity made it easier for them to make credible
commitments to each other, and eventually to elicit ongoing investment of
human capital by specialized managers, along with committed financial capital
from financial investors.'53 The corporate form therefore provided a more reliable
basis for building organizational capital than did either an individual
proprietorship or a partnership.'54 To build sustainable organizations, individuals
with sufficient talent and experience to run a business operation had to be
induced to give up their own entrepreneurial aspirations in order to work in a
business in which they would not be independent and might not share directly
in the potential business profits.'55 The corporate form gave stability to the
business enterprise which helped ensure these professional managers that their
firm-specific investments would be protected, along with the dedicated physical
and financial capital, and that they would have substantial input in how the
business would be run.
In the next part, I review the various aspects of early corporate law that
supported the commitment of resources to the enterprise, and thereby facilitated
the development of organizational capital.
C. "Asset Partitioning" Under the Law
As we have seen, the legal treatment of incorporated businesses as separate
legal entities was necessary for full partitioning of assets-both protecting the
investors in the business from claims by creditors of the business, and protecting
the assets of the business from premature dissolution and distribution. For corpo-
rations that were serving some sort of public purpose, in which the contribution
152. Lamoreaux, supra note 46, at 11 (noting that "the vast majority of enterprises that took out cor-
porate charters were small and medium-sized firms").
153. Chandler hints that incorporation was important for a business to be managed by salaried man-
agers rather than by owners. VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 29-30.
154. Hurst says that "continuity was important to effective organization," and that incorporation
gave the business "considerable assurance of tenure." HURST, supra note 4, at 25. But he does not go
deeper to explain why continuity was important. See also VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 10 (noting that
"the continuing existence of their enterprises" was "essential" to the lifetime careers of individuals who
became salaried managers).
155. THOMAS C. COCHRAN, THE AMERICAN BUSINESS SYSTEM: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1900-1955, at 5 (1957) (arguing that Americans were a particularly entrepreneurial crowd). Zunz is the
only historian of the period I have found who directly addresses the question of why previously independent
business people and professionals, who apparently valued their independence, were willing to become
employees of corporations in the latter half of the nineteenth century. ZUNZ, supra note 26, at 39;
discussion infra notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
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of capital was made for charitable or civic responsibility reasons and without
expectation of return, this partitioning was needed to ensure that the assets
stayed committed to the purpose for which the corporation was chartered.' 6
The distinction between these early civic, religious, and charitable corpo-
rations and some of the earliest business corporations may not have been obvious.
Many early business corporations were very capital intensive, such as canals and
turnpikes, and/or were generally of a type that required substantial financial
capital such as banks and insurance companies. Both types were also intended to
serve a broad, quasi-public purpose. An economist today might say that these
businesses provided significant positive externalities. In fact, many of these
businesses might more appropriately be regarded as public works projects, which
the states did not want to have to use their taxing authority to finance.'57 Often
they were highly risky enterprises, which not infrequently failed to earn any pro-
fits at all."' And even when the businesses were able to earn a profit, it was not
uncommon that the assets of the business, including the special franchise they
had, would revert to the government after some specified period of time. The
investors were allowed to earn fees or collect tolls during the time they controlled
the assets, but were not to receive their initial capital back.'59 In the case of the
Lehigh River navigation project, for example, the State of Pennsylvania granted
White, Hauto, and Hazard the right to collect tolls on boats passing down the
Lehigh for thirty-six years. After that time, the State of Pennsylvania would
have the option of buying back the rights to control the Lehigh River from
White, Hauto, and Hazard, at a price to be determined by taking the average of
the tolls collected during the most recent six years, and capitalizing that income
flow using a discount rate of 6 percent per annum.10
In exchange for the privilege of operating such businesses, which might
occasionally prove highly profitable, the promoters were required to raise and
156. The other legal rule that was needed was a rule of fiduciary duty preventing managers of those
religious, eleemosynary, or public corporations from appropriating the corporation's assets for themselves.
157. Hurst has noted that many of the ventures undertaken by the earliest business corporations
were "public utility-type enterprises." HURST, supra note 4, at 35.
158. Dodd cites the judge in Essex Turnpike Corp. v. Coins, 8 Mass. 292, 296 (1811), as noting:
It is well known that in this country enterprises of this description have not been productive of
profit to those who have engaged in them; nor is this generally a primary object of consideration
with the subscribers. They are well aware that the community is benefited by them and they
agree to take a share of the burden.
DODD, supra note 13, at 79 n.27.
159. Smith cites sources noting that toll roads and bridges built and operated by early corporations
often reverted to public ownership after a term of a specified number of years, so that the initial subscribers
could recover only the tolls and fees they could collect (net of operating costs) during the life of the
agreement. Smith, supra note 138, at 301 n. 115.
160. See AN ACT TO IMPROVE THE NAVIGATION OF THE RIVER LEHIGH § 19, reprinted in ACTS OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 111, at 16.
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commit substantial amounts of capital.' In some cases, if organizers were unable
to raise the amount promised, they forfeited the corporate charter, or the special
franchise or privilege that had come with incorporation.
6 2
As charters were issued for more purposes, and without special franchises,
presumably the organizers were hoping to earn some kind of return on their
investments.63 Thus rules were needed that would lock in a sufficient body of
assets in the business while still permitting investors to extract some funds from
the corporations when surpluses were generated.'64 One way this was achieved
was the designation of a "par value" for each share of stock, which represented
161. The charter of the Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of Philadelphia was originally organized in
1807 as a joint stock association, with initial investors committing to invest $700,000, to be paid in install-
ments over the first ten months of its existence. THE CHARTERS AND BY-LAWS OF THE FARMERs' AND
MECHANIcS' BANK5 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1849). Two years later, a new corporate charter
granted to the organizers by the State of Pennsylvania provided that the "joint stock, and all the goods,
chattels, moneys, debts and other property, real or personal" of the predecessor association would be trans-
ferred to and vested in the incorporated entity. See also the charter of Dartmouth College, at issue
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517, 685 (1819) (stating that "Dr.
Wheelock had founded a charity-school at his own expense, on his own estate; that divers contributions
had been made in the colonies, by others, for its support; [and] that new contributions had been made, and
were making, in England for this purpose"). Legislatures also often imposed upper limits on capitalization
too, apparently because of the general fear of concentrations of financial power. According to Seavoy, for
example, the general incorporation statute for manufacturers passed by the New York legislature in 1811
was an "aggregate of generalized provisions from the charters passed during the preceding three years," and
it limited capitalization to $100,000. SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 65.
162. "Some incorporation acts of the period-particularly those relating to such public utilities as
tumpikes-made the subscription to a certain number of shares a condition precedent to incorpora-
tion...." DODD, supra note 13, at 80. The states had a special interest in being sure that subscriptions for
incorporated banks were paid before the bank could do business. See id. at 211-12. Dodd notes:
In chartering banks, a matter of paramount public concern is the protection of depositors and
noteholders, and the [Massachusetts] act of 1829 contained a number of provisions designed to
accomplish this object. No bank could legally do business until commissioners appointed by the
governor should have ascertained that it had in its vaults gold and silver equal to one-half its
capital and should have received from the directors a sworn statement that there were no strings
attached to this money. No shareholder could legally borrow from the bank until his subscription
had been paid in full, and no shares could be transferred until the entire capital was paid in.
Id.
163. Concepts such as "return on capital" had not been developed formally as of the early nine-
teenth century, so investors might not have thought explicitly in terms of demanding a return on capital.
Chandler says that it wasn't until the 1870s that managers of railroads began to regularly set aside funding
out of month-to-month revenues for anticipated repair and maintenance (an accounting precursor to
depreciation allowances). VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 112. But clearly investors were aware at some
level of the opportunity cost of capital, and expected to be paid at least as much as they might earn in
alternative investments. See EXTRACTS FROM THE CONSTIUTION AND ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF
THE LEHIGH COAL AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, article VI (1821), reprinted in ACTS OF THE GIkERAL
ASSEMBLY, supra note 111, at 32 (requiring that investors get dividends of 3 percent semiannually).
164. Early corporate charters were often issued for specific periods of time, such as ten or fifteen years,
although they could be renewed. Delaware's 1831 Constitution, for example, provided that no act of
incorporation should continue in effect for more than twenty years, unless renewed by the legislature. See
DEL. CONsT. of 1831, art. II § 17.
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the dollar amount the shareholder was committed to putting into the enterprise
per share.' The initial shares might often be issued to subscribers for a fraction
of par value, and the corporation would then begin its business with the money
raised from these initial installments. But when this approach was used, charters
always provided that the corporation could go back to the subscribers at any time
in the future and require them to pay the rest of the promised commitment.'66
Case law established fairly early on that shareholders were potentially liable for
corporate debts at least up to the amount they had pledged in their initial sub-
scription.' 67 Thus, from the time of the earliest corporations, financial investors
who wanted to participate in a business organized as a corporation had to make
substantial financial commitments, and these commitments were considered part
of the corporation's permanent capital.
Once committed, the capital paid into a corporation by its initial inves-
tors could be very difficult to recover. Early charters and statutes typically
specified that shareholders, or "members" as they were likely to be called, could
not withdraw their capital unless the enterprise was formally dissolved. But
these charters and statutes did provide that investors could receive dividends
out of operating profits, 168 though not out of the permanent capital of the
corporation. 69  Restrictions on dividends in early corporate charters were
implicit: Directors or officers of the incorporated companies were authorized to
pay dividends out of the "clear profits and income" of the firm, according to one
165. O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, sup-ra note 78, at 568 ("The early corporation codes [typically]
required each corporation to specify (in its article of incorporation) a par value for its stock, and defined
a corporation's legal capital as an amount equal to the product obtained by multiplying the number of
outstanding shares times the par value of such shares."). Seavoy enumerates twenty-eight incorporation
statutes (covering different types of organizations and businesses) passed by the State of New York from
1847 through 1854 and notes that, under these laws, "investors almost always retained double liability until
shares were fully paid-in." SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 191-92.
166. See DODD, supra note 13, at 74-75; discussion supra, note 10. Handlin and Handlin claim that
prior to the nineteenth century, corporate charters commonly did not specify a par value for their shares,
and in such cases there was no legal limit to the assessments that could be made against shareholders. Oscar
Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HisT. 1, 13 (1945)
("As first organized, therefore, corporations could replenish their coffers by drawing without limit on the
resources of all their members."). In such finns, potential shareholder liability was not limited. See also the
discussion of limited liability, infra Part III.E.
167. See, e.g., Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. Ch. 456 (N.Y. Ch. 1822) (finding that the only difference
between partnerships and corporations is that in the latter, any responsibility beyond the amount of indi-
vidual subscriptions is exonerated). Initial shareholders might be held liable even beyond their pledges in
some instances. The question of whether shareholders should have full liability or limited liability was
hotly debated during the convention that ultimately passed the New York Constitution of 1846, for
example, and the final document provided for proportional liability. See SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 185-86.
168. No distinction was made in primitive accounting between operating profits and net profits.
169. See, e.g., O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 78, at 568 ('The typical statute permitted corpo-
rations to make periodic distributions to shareholders out of profits or surplus, but prohibited distributions to
shareholders out of a corporation's permanent or legal capital.").
430
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1798 charter,"'° or out of the "profits, premiums and interests of the Bank,"
according to a 1795 charter,' or out of "monies arising from the profits of the
said manufactury," according to a 1794 charter establishing a woolen manufac-
turing plant."' The charters did not authorize payment of dividends out of the
permanent capital of the firms, however, and later charters tended to emphasize
that the officers and directors did not even have to pay all of the profits out as
dividends, but only as much as they deemed prudent.'73 Moreover, shareholders
did not have a legal right to receive any dividend at all unless it was declared by
directors. 74 Also, early case law emphasized that the resources that had been
invested in corporations no longer belonged to the shareholders, but rather,
remained the property of the corporation unless and until paid out in the form of
dividends.' 5
Predictably, business organizers did not always completely succeed
at locking in capital through the use of the corporate form. In 1813, for
example, Francis Cabot Lowell and eleven associates were granted a charter of
incorporation from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to form the
Boston Manufacturing Company, capitalized at $300,000-a huge sum at the
time. Lowell built the first integrated textile factory in the United States, with
both spinning and weaving machinery under the same roof.'76 The venture
introduced many technical and managerial innovations.'77 By 1817, the
company was so profitable that it paid a dividend of 17 percent on invested
capital.7 8 Francis Lowell died that year, however, and from that point on, the
voice of restraint in paying out capital was lost. In 1820, the firm declared a
$50,000 dividend, and decided to issue new shares to finance any further
expansion rather than retain earnings. Moreover, they decided to pay another
dividend of $90,000 out of funds raised from selling new stock! In 1822, the firm
sold its machine shop, and treated the proceeds of the sale as profit, declaring
another $100,000 in dividends, as well as a 25 percent (on invested capital)
170. See Act of Apr. 4, 1798, ch. 88,1798 N.Y. Laws 264, 267.
171. See Act of Feb. 27, 1795, ch. 32, 1795 Mass. Acts 467.
172. See Act ofJan. 29, 1794, ch. 1, 1794 Mass. Acts 337,340.
173. See Smith, supra note 138, at 297 n.97. A number of the examples used in this part are taken
from Smith.
174. Id. at 298 n.98 (citing Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 111 (1868)) ("The money in the hands of
the directors may be income to the corporation; but it is not so to a stockholder till a dividend is
made....").
175. See, e.g., Brightwell v. Mallory, 18 Tenn. (1 Yet.) 196, 197-98 (1836) ('The money in the
[corporation] is the property of the institution, and to the ownership of which the stockholder has no more
claim than a person has who is not at all connected with the [corporation].").
176. BARBARA M. TUCKER, SAMUEL SLATER AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN TEXTILE
INDUSTRY, 1790-1860, at 113-15 (1984).
177. Id. at 115-16 (describing the structure of relationships among the board of directors, the treas-
urer, and the factory agent, as well as the use of young, unmarried women to operate the machines).
178. Id. at 116.
HeinOnline  -- 51 UCLA L. Rev. 431 2003-2004
432 51 UCLA LAW REVIEW 387 (2003)
dividend in 1823, a 25 percent dividend in 1824, and a 35 percent dividend in
1825.' Historian Robert Spaldings ° observes that the sale of the machine
shop appears to have been a carefully engineered transaction designed to drive up
the price of Boston Manufacturing Company shares, noting that three of the
largest shareholders disposed of the major portion of their shares during the
months after the sales, as high dividends were being paid out. The value of
Boston Manufacturing Company stock fell steadily after 1825, Spalding notes,
bottoming out in 1829, and after that "its performance was undistinguished."'
18
Thus, the corporate form, by itself, did not prevent asset stripping, but it gave
directors and managers the legal tool to prevent asset stripping if they chose to do
SO.
A final feature of corporate law in the nineteenth century supports the idea
that the corporate form was a mechanism for securing bonding assets: This is the
development of the "trust fund" doctrine. The modem trust fund doctrine holds
that, in an insolvent corporation, the directors have fiduciary duties running to
creditors because corporate assets are held in trust to satisfy creditors first.' The
doctrine developed in a number of earlier cases, but Justice Story clearly articu-
lated it in an 1824 case, Wood v. Dummer.5 3 This case involved an incorporated
bank that dissolved and distributed its remaining capital to its shareholders while
there were bank notes still outstanding. The holders of the notes then filed suit
against certain of the stockholders seeking to be paid for their notes out of the
distributed assets. Justice Story's answer leaves no question about the function
of paid-in capital:
It appears to me very clear upon general principles, as well as the legislative
intention, that the capital stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust
fund for the payment of the debts contracted by the bank. The public, as
well as the legislature, have always supposed this to be a fund appropriated
for such a purpose. The individual stockholders are not liable for the debts
of the bank in their private capacities. The charter relieves them from
personal responsibility, and substitutes the capital stock in its stead. Credit
is universally given to this found [sic] by the public, and as the only means
of repayment. During the existence of the corporation it is the sole
property of the corporation, and can be applied only according to its
179. Id. at 116-17.
180. TUCKER, supra note 176, at 116 (citing Robert Vanum Spalding, The Boston Mercantile
Community and the Promotion of the Textile Industry in New England, 1813-1860, at 41 (1963) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University)).
181. Id. at 116 n.75.
182. In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1269 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining that when a
corporation becomes insolvent, the equitable interest of the stockholders in the property, together with
their conditional liability to the creditors, places the property in a condition of trust, first for the creditors
and then for the stockholders).
183. 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824).
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charter, that is, as a fund for payment of its debts, upon the security of
which it may discount and circulate notes. Why, otherwise, is any capital
stock required by our charters? If the stock may, the next day after it is
paid in, be withdrawn by the stockholders without payment of the debts of
the corporation, why is its amount so studiously provided for, and its pay-
ment by the stockholders so diligently required? To me this point appears
so plain upon principles of law, as well as common sense, that I cannot be
brought into any doubt that the charters of our banks make the capital
stock a trust fund for the payment of all the debts of the corpora-
tion.... [The rights of stockholders] are not to the capital stock, but to the
residuum after all demands on it are paid.1
4
The case involved the capital stock of a bank, but the notion was broadly
applied to corporations of all types."'5 Investors in shares as well as creditors,
employees, and suppliers could thus all enter into long-term relationships with a
corporation with greater assurance that a pool of assets would remain in the
business to help keep the business going forward.'86
D. Boards of Directors and Restrictions on Shareholder Control
This Article argues that the "separation of ownership from control," far
from being an infirmity of the corporate form, was actually one of the most
important benefits of the corporate form. Early articles of association of joint
stock companies, as well as most corporate charters, provided that decision-
making authority for the company would be delegated to a group that was legally
distinct from the contributors of financial capital (though this group often
included major investors).'87 In unincorporated joint stock companies, this
184. Id. at 436.
185. See DODD, supra note 13, at 29 (citing Kent's 1848 edition, and noting that "capital and debts
of banking and other moneyed corporations constitute a trust fund and pledge for payments of creditors and
stockholders").
186. Both paid-in-capital rules, and rules restricting payment of dividends out of capital have been
substantially relaxed since the middle of the twentieth century. But corporate law generally requires that
dividends or other distributions cannot be made if doing so would jeopardize the ability of the corporation
to pay debts as they come due. See, for example, MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c) (2002), which states:
No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect: (1) the corporation would not be able to pay
its debts as they become due in the usual course of business; or (2) the corporation's total assets
would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus (unless the articles of incorporation pennit
otherwise) the amount that would be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time
of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders whose
preferential rights are superior to those receiving the distribution.
Id.
187. Members, or subscribers (as shareholder in early corporations were often called) may have been
able sometimes to elect corporate officers directly, without electing a board of directors to act for them in
choosing officers. But boards of directors or similar institutional arrangements, though they may not have
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delegation of decisionmaking authority was necessary to get around the default
rule of partnerships that major decisions must be made by unanimous decision of
the partners. 8' A requirement of unanimous decisionmaking, we have seen,
gives every partner the power to compel dissolution, or hold up the other
partners in an effort to extract more of the wealth being created by the joint
enterprise. Delegation of authority to a small decisionmaking body streamlines
decisionmaking in large organizations with many investors and participants,
and numerous other scholars have noted that the resulting "centralization" of
control is one of the benefits of incorporation9
In corporations, because the law recognizes the corporation as a separate
legal entity, the law also insists that some designated group of human persons
be made responsible and accountable for the activities of the participants in the
business, at least insofar as those activities relate to the carrying out of the busi-
ness for which the firm was incorporated.
But in addition, I would suggest that the benefits of assigning decision-
making authority to a board of managers, or board of directors, are not just that it
streamlines decisionmaking (relative to unanimous approval by numerous
partners), and identifies accountable human persons to act for the entity.
Instead, the benefit is that assigning decisionmaking to a board restricts the control
that various individual participants, such as the president, or a major financial investor,
might otherwise have. Decisionmaking by a designated small group thereby helps
assure all participants that financial investors will not be able to easily pull assets
out of the firm once other participants have made investments that are
committed to the enterprise, and that active managers will not be allowed to use
the assets of the firm for their own personal benefit. Thus, when decisionmaking
authority is allocated to a board of directors, individual team members relinquish
some of the ability they might otherwise have had to hold up other members.
This makes their commitments to engage with the others in a cooperative way
more credible.
been statutorily required for every corporation, appeared early and appear to have been required by most
general incorporation statutes. See further the discussion infra notes 190-193.
188. Decisionmaking authority was usually granted to the trustees of the trust created to hold the
joint assets of the company.
189. See, e.g., O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 78, at 95 (noting that under the Uniform
Partnership Act, "each partner has equal rights in the management and conduct of partnership
business"); id. at 154 (noting that "[tihe corporate form provides a hierarchical form for decision-
making"); HURST, supra note 4, at 24 ("The corporation met the need to develop organization as a
major economic asset by legitimating a combination of strong central direction and limited
commitments.").
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There is substantial evidence that boards of managers or directors were a
common feature of the earliest corporations.' 9 The board of directors was legally
recognized as an independent body,"' and boards were required to act col-
lectively. '92 The company's charter had to specify generally how directors were to
be chosen. In the early and mid-nineteenth century, the selection process was
often by a majority or two-thirds vote of shareholders, with each shareholder
receiving one vote.'93 By the late nineteenth century, one vote per share became
more common.'94 The charter of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company
used a complex formula that allocated one vote to any shareholder who held ten
or fewer shares; one vote for every ten shares for each shareholder who held more
than ten, but not more than 100 shares; and one vote for every twenty shares
above 100 for each shareholder holding more than 100 but not more than 500
shares, in addition to the number of votes allowed on the first 100; finally, hold-
ers of more than 500 shares were to receive the same number of votes as holders
of 500 shares, plus three votes for each additional 100 shares they hold.
Shareholders were not entitled to vote at all unless they had held their shares
for at least six months.9 This declining voting power arrangement gave small
investors disproportionate voting rights, presumably to help protect them from
190. Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 91, at 482-83 (citing BAGNALL, supra note 91, at 406-09, and
CAROLINE F. WARE, THE EARLY NEW ENGLAND COTTON MANUFACTURE 21 (1931)). According to
Sowards and Mofsky:
Two business histories dealing with this area describe delegation of authority to boards of direc-
tors or managers in early textile firms in a manner generally associated with modem corporations.
Such delegation existed in joint stock associations before the promoters of textile firms first made
extensive use of the corporate form. A third study also describes several mining companies which
were formed as joint stock associations around 1790.
Id. at 482 (citing LIVERMORE, supra note 4, at 240). They cite provisions of the articles of association of
the Lehigh Coal Mining Company (the predecessor to the company later organized by White, Hazard, and
Hauto, described supra Part 1) by which shareholders are to elect a president, eight "managers," and a
treasurer, with the president and managers "vested with complete authority over the property of the
business."
191. Directors were not "agents" of shareholders, as has been commonly claimed in recent decades.
192. Generally charters provided for approval by a majority, or perhaps two-thirds, of board mem-
bers. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisioninaking in Corporate Governance, 55
VAND. L. REv. 1 (2002) (discussing why certain kinds of decisions are improved by group decisionmaking).
193. See, e.g., Colleen A. Dunlavy, Corporate Governance in Late 19J-Century Europe and the U.S.
The Case of Shareholder Votng Rights, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 (Klaus J. Hopt et al.
eds., 1998).
194. This, of course, gave large investors more power in the selection of directors, and raised prob-
lems by the early twentieth century of large investors attempting to squeeze out or "oppress" small investors.
These latter problems have been addressed by legislatures and courts through "minority oppression" rules.
Sowards and Mofsky note that the corporate law standards that were developed in the early nineteenth
century "were appropriate for the publicly held corporations and in many respects inappropriate for the
close corporation." Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 91, at 491; see also Henry G. Manne, Our Two
Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967).
195. ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 111, at 25-26.
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abuses by large investors. In any case, selection of directors almost never required
the unanimous vote of members (shareholders), which meant that no individual
participant in corporations had veto power over the choice of directors or over
the other major decisions participants wanted to make.
Directors of nineteenth century corporations were typically chosen from
among stockholders. Nonetheless, legally their role as directors was distinct from
the role any one of them could play as a contributor of financial or human
capital.'96 Thus putting in place a board of directors institutes a mechanism
that can help to mediate among competing interests in a corporation, as well as
to represent the corporation to outsiders. For example, it seems likely that dis-
agreements over the use of corporate resources between active shareholders
(whose livelihoods and personal goals are also tied up in the business) and pas-
sive shareholders, or among other subsets of the team members, would have
been common. How much of the revenues should be paid out in dividends, for
example, and how much should be reinvested to expand the business?' 97 In
196. Some early charters and statutes appear to have required that directors be stockholders. See
Smith, supra note 138, and cases cited therein. The charter of the Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of
Philadelphia (incorporated in 1809), however, required that "a majority of the directors.., be farmers,
mechanics, or manufacturers actually employed in their respective professions .... An Act to Incorporate
the Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, § 4, art. II, 1809 Pa. Laws 973-74. This requirement suggests that
the directors were expected to play a role in representing the interests of the borrowers from the bank,
as well as the interests of investors in the capital stock of the bank. As other scholars have noted, it is
common today among venture capital firms for several directors to be named who are neither members
of management, nor representatives of the venture capitalists. See, for example, Whincop, supra note
24, at 84-85, who notes that venture capital finns "require the presence of at least one non-executive
director, often more," and that standard explanations for the role of the board in representing
shareholders' interests do not explain this phenomenon because "venture capitalists have all the incen-
tive and power they need to keep management in line...." Hence he argues that one of the purposes
of outside directors is to help foster "trust between, and mediating RPNs [relationship preserving norms]
applicable to, the entrepreneur and the investor... . The board's essentially collegial, collective decision-
making [transforms] the entrepreneur-investor relation from [a] bilaterally bargained, adversarial
context .. " Id. at 85. These "outsiders" often control the swing vote in corporate decisions. A board
of seven directors in a typical venture capital firm, for example, is likely to include two from manage-
ment, two representatives of the venture capitalist, and three respected individuals from the community
of people with whom the firm will work (such as executives or investors in other firms in related indus-
tries). See, e.g., Julia Porter Liebeskind, Ownership, Incentives, and Control in New Biotechnology Firms, in
THE NEW RELATIONSHIP, supra note 51, at 299, 322. Whincop speculates that such outside directors
may also play a key role in facilitating relationships with other corporate participants. Whincop, supra note
24, at 86 ("[While the [outside] director will be appointed for the welfare of the business, and thus its share-
holders, the agent analogy is inaccurate, the focus is outward not inward, and the director's identification
with other social groups may be quite as strong as that with the investors."). Whincop's observations refer
to contemporary venture capital firms, but the analogy to early corporations seems probable. So far, how-
ever, I have tracked down very little direct evidence of who directors of nineteenth century corporations
were and what role they played.
197. This was a common source of dispute between managers and more passive investors. VISIBLE
HAND, supra note 16, at 145-46 (discussing conflicts between career managers and top executives and
board members in railroad companies over reinvestment strategies).
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forming a corporation, all of the team members agree in advance that such
decisions will be the responsibility of the board of directors. This mediating
role probably became more important over time, as the number of people
engaging with the corporation grew past the point where all of the participants
could be expected to know each other personally.
E. What About Limited Liability?
Numerous legal and business historians have proposed that the attraction of
the corporate form to organizers of large-scale business in the nineteenth century
was the fact that the form offered the protection of limited liability.
9 "Limited
liability" means that investors will (normally) not be held personally liable for
debts and other obligations of the business. If a corporation is granted limited
liability at the time it is formed,'9 9 the personal assets of organizers and investors
that have not already been committed to the enterprise would henceforth be
protected from claims against the business."
Although limited liability became one of the defining characteristics of the
corporate form in the early and mid-twentieth century, many early corporations
were organized under charters that did not grant limited liability. Stockholders
in early chartered banks, for example, often did not have limited liability.
2 '
The first general incorporation act for manufacturers in Massachusetts, passed
in 1809, specifically provided for unlimited liability for shareholders.
2 2 In fact,
198. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 108, at 201 ("The overriding need was for an efficient,
trouble-free device to aggregate capital and manage it in business, with limited liability and transferable
shares."); see also Mahoney, supra note 87, at 875 ("In [the] standard story of the growth of the corporate
form, the innovation of limited liability takes primacy."). Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of
Columbia University in 1912, called "the limited liability corporation" the "greatest single discovery of
modern times." MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED
CORPORATION PROBLEMS (1927) (quoting NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, WHY SHOULD WE CHANGE
OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT 82 (1912)).
199. Today, the process of incorporation ensures the protection of limited liability for corporate
shareholders and other participants, unless the corporate charter specifies otherwise, but in the first half of
the nineteenth century, limited liability could not be assumed, and a number of early incorporation statutes
explicitly provided otherwise. See the discussion infra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
200. Even if a corporation were granted limited liability, shareholders could be held liable for corpo-
rate obligations at least up to the par value of their stock, if the shareholder had not paid in full for the stock
at the time the stock was issued. In some early corporations, especially banks, shareholders were potentially
subject to double liability. See the discussion supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.
201. FRIEDMAN, supra note 108, at 191 ("Limited liability-now considered one of the main objects
of incorporation-was not universally available in the 19th century. Bank stock did not possess this great
boon in New York, for example."); see also Mark I. Weinstein, Share Price Changes and the Arrival of Limited
Liability in Califomia, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2003) ("mhe last major jurisdiction to adopt limited liability
[was] California, which did not adopt limited liability for corporations until 1931.").
202. Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 91, at 483 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 65, 1809 Mass. Acts
404,406).
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Oscar and Mary Handlin claim that during the first thirty years after independ-
ence, no charter granted in Massachusetts provided for limited liability. °3
A New York general incorporation statute of 1811 for textile manufacturers
provided that if a corporation was dissolved, then at that time, "persons then
composing such a company shall be individually responsible to the extent of their
respective shares of stock in said company and no further."2 4 Liability was lim-
ited for the organizers of these mills to provide special financial incentives to
business people who would finance textile manufacturing."' The reason was that
the British had cut off supplies of textiles to the states leading up to the War of
1812, and therefore investments in manufacturing textiles were considered to
be in the public interest.2" The clear language of the statute limited the liability
of members of corporations formed under the Act, but it was not clear whether
liability was meant to be limited only to the par value of the stock, or whether,
upon dissolution, stockholders might be assessable a second time up to the limit
of the par value of the stock (thereby imposing double liability on stockholders).
In either case, of course, liability was limited, and this established an important
exception to the general rule. But the question of how the limit was to be
interpreted became important a few years later when, after the war was over, the
British flooded the U.S. market with textiles, and a number of the mills
established under the 1811 Act went into bankruptcy.
The case of Slee v. Bloom2°7 grew out of the bankruptcy of the Dutchess
Cotton Manufactury, organized in 1814 under the 1811 Act.20 8 By 1815, the
business needed more capital and stockholders were assessed for further contri-
butions. Most of the stockholders ignored the calls, and the business was dis-
continued in October 1816. The accumulated debts of the corporation were
large, but were mostly owed to one person, Samuel Slee, who had been the
owner of a mill sold to the company two years earlier. Slee had sold the mill for
stock and cash, but had never received the cash. So Slee sued to collect the
unpaid cash from the other stockholders, who had never fully paid on their stock
subscriptions.
203. See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 166, at 10. The California corporate law provided for
unlimited proportionate liability as the default rule for corporations until well into the twentieth century.
See Weinstein, supra note 201, at 5 ("The California Constitution of 1879 mandated pro rata unlimited
liability for firms incorporated in California....").
204. DODD, supra note 13, at64 (citing Act of Mar. 22,1811, ch. 67,1811 N.Y. Laws 111, 113).
205. It is not at all clear, however, that total financing costs would be cheaper for textile firms that
had limited liability because, presumably, creditors of such firms would have to charge a higher rate of
interest to compensate them for the higher risk they were bearing, or would require organizers to co-sign
notes, thereby making them personally liable for debts of the enterprise.
206. SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 64-66.
207. 19 Johns. Ch. 456 (N.Y. Ch. 1822).
208. SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 68.
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The Court of Chancery had to first consider whether a corporation having
no assets should be considered dissolved, so that a creditor could go after
members for at least what they should have paid in for their shares. On this
matter, the court agreed that a corporation was dissolved if it was without assets,
so that a judicial remedy could be applied to go after the corporation's
shareholders on behalf of the creditors. The judgment made it clear that the
court could go after shareholders for at least the par value of their stock. In the
opinion, Chief Justice Spencer seems to interpret this language to mean only
their initial pledge: "The only advantages of an incorporation under the statute
over partnerships ... consists in a capacity to manage the affairs of the institution
by a few agents, and by an exoneration from responsibility beyond the amount of
the individual subscriptions.'' "°
Sometime during the next few decades, limited liability came to be seen as
the default rule in most states. By the time that Joseph Angell and Samuel Ames
published their treatise on corporate law in 1832, limited liability was seen as one
of the primary motivating factors encouraging the use of the corporate form.21°
Limited liability helps solve some of the contracting problems for par-
ticipants in a large and complex business. The business can grow, new
obligations can be incurred, and new investors, officers, directors, and managers
can be brought in without changing the maximum potential losses of the existing
participants. Each one has her potential liability capped. Also, none of the
participants (neither the original members of the team, nor new ones brought
in later) need to worry about whether their fellow participants can contribute
their share to cover any future business debts or losses.21' Although these advan-
tages of corporate form do not, by themselves, reduce the total business risk
involved in making specialized investments, they do reduce the risks that arise
from the possibility that other investors in the business might engage in oppor-
tunistic behavior--or just experience bad luck. Recall that in a partnership,
by contrast, if any partner spends, loses, transfers, or otherwise disposes of her
personal, nonbusiness related assets, the vulnerability of other partners to
209. Slee, 19 Johns. Ch. at 474.
210. ANGELL & AMEs, supra note 138, at 23-24. Angell and Ames observe:
It is frequently the principal object, in this and in other countries, in procuring an act of incor-
poration, to limit the risk of the partners to their shares in the stock of the association; and
prudent men are always backward in taking stock when they become mere copartners as regards
their personal liability for the company debts. The public, therefore, gain by the acts
incorporating trading associations, as by such means persons are induced to hazard a certain
amount of property for the purposes of trade and public improvement, who would abstain from so
doing, were not their liability thus limited.
Id.
211. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Linited Liabiity and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI.
L REV. 89 (1985), for a full development of this argument. See, e.g., PRESSER, supra note 10, at §§ 1.01-
.06 (giving a historical and analytical review of limited liability and the veil-piercing doctrine).
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business losses would be increased. This is because business claimants seeking
recovery from the personal assets of partners might find that some of the partners
cannot pay. The burden would then fall more heavily on the remaining partners,
who are jointly responsible. Thus limited liability eliminates the need that team
members might otherwise have to monitor each other's personal business, outside
the context of the enterprise they are jointly engaged in.212
Limited liability also allows for individuals with limited wealth to invest
in small amounts, without subjecting themselves to potentially catastrophic
liabilities. As White and Hazard went out to raise their third and fourth round
of capital, they were probably approaching potential investors who had some
modest funds to invest, but were not wealthy. They probably also approached
wealthy investors who had not previously known White and Hazard, and did
not have reassurances through their personal relationship with them that they
would eventually make the business profitable. Without the benefit of limited
liability, these new investors had no way of knowing their maximum downside
risk.
Limited liability is hence a virtual necessity for the development of markets
in which shares can be traded-undoubtedly extremely important in the long
run development of modem corporations. Yet limited liability cannot fully
explain why business people began seeking out incorporation in the nineteenth
century, because early corporations were not always granted limited liability." 3 It
appears that business people began seeking out and using the corporate form in
the nineteenth century even in situations when it did not automatically provide
limited liability.
Finally, it is worth noting that, even if a business did incorporate and the
terms of the charter limited the liability of the stockholders for business debts,
creditors would commonly insist that the business organizers pledge their
personal assets to back debt incurred by the corporations. Thus, in the early years
at least, the benefits of limited liability may not have exceeded its costs. Limited
212. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 211.
213. PRESSER, supra note 10, at § 1.03[1]. Presser notes that limited liability may not have been
the prime inducement for early incorporators. Instead, "other aspects of 'corporateness,' such as the
ability to have a centralized management, to hold property in the name of the corporation, and to possess
more extended or perpetual life than was possible in the sole proprietorship, joint venture, or partnership
form" may have been the primary attractions. Presser notes that legislators in some states, notably
Massachusetts, in fact made a point of imposing unlimited liability early in the nineteenth century as
part of a deliberate policy of protecting creditors. Id.; see also Hamill, supra note 145, at 91 n.42 ("The
most recognized corporate legal benefit in the twentieth century, limited liability protection to all
shareholders, was not the principal reason for seeking a corporate charter in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries."); Mahoney, supra note 87, at 890 (noting that merchants in England in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries "did not clamor for limited liability," and that in the
United States as late as the 1840s "merchants for the most part opposed limited liability," arguing that
"owner liability was necessary for creditworthiness").
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liability was, at best, one part of what business people were trying to achieve by
incorporating.
IV. BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL CAPITAL
This part will review some largely anecdotal evidence that the use of the
corporate form for business enterprises grew hand-in-hand with the building of
hierarchical management structures, the emergence of a class of middle manag-
ers and technical specialists with long-term careers as company employees, and
the branding of products headed for broad consumer markets. The evidence
does not definitively prove that one caused the other, nor even that the corpo-
rate form was necessary to build and accumulate such organizational assets. But it
is clear that by the early twentieth century, incorporated entities had become the
most important repositories of organizational and reputational assets, in addition
to physical capital, in the private sector. Despite the fact that individual proprie-
torships and partnerships have always vastly outnumbered corporate entities, few
of them have managed to achieve the scale of modem incorporated entities.214
Chandler has extensively documented the rise of large, multi-unit business
organizations in the United States after about 1840. He argues that these organi-
zations began to appear when there began to be significant economic benefits
from the coordination of economic activity through administrative structures
rather than through markets, and that these organizations required managerial
hierarchies.215 These hierarchies, in turn, added to the stability and permanence
of the organizations.' 6 Chandler observed, "Men came and went. The institu-
tion and its offices remained. 2 7
I will not attempt to repeat or review what Chandler has already accom-
plished, except to highlight the role played by incorporation of the business
enterprise. The brief first part of Chandler's great work, The Visible Hand,
reviews the nature of small businesses that prevailed in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century, and observes that as firms began to take on larger more
complicated tasks (especially finance and transportation), they were more likely
to be incorporated and "in these firms one or two full-time salaried managers,
rather than the owners, came to administer the enterprise..'.. Chandler notes:
At first, the board of directors, consisting of local merchants and
manufacturers, made decisions in consultation with [the salaried
214. The main exceptions appear to be family firms. See generally SCALE AND SCOPE, supra note
17; Smith & Dyer, supra note 17, at 28-73; discussion infra notes 269-276 and accompanying text.
215. VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 6-7.
216. Id. at 6-8.
217. Id. at8.
218. Id. at41.
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managers], on those matters which required business judgment and dis-
cretion... [But] because board members were busy with their own affairs,
these decisions were soon turned over to committees of the board which
met weekly or often only once a month.219
Soon, however, the full-time managers took over most of the day-to-day deci-
sionmaking, with the boards and their committees "becoming little more than
ratifying bodies., 20 But Chandler does not explore what it was about the corpo-
rate structure, other than the ability to amass larger amounts of capital, that made
it more suitable to organizing larger business ventures.
A. Why I. M. Singer & Company Had to Incorporate
Chandler's first example of organizations that developed hierarchical struc-
tures and sophisticated internal information and control techniques were the
railroads. 2 It seems obvious that the corporate form was a near necessity for
building a railroad, because, just as Hazard and White came to realize that they
needed to utilize the corporate form to amass enough capital and lock it in to the
river navigation project, railroad promoters would also need to use an organiza-
tional form that would enable them to raise capital that could be irrevocably
committed to the enterprise. So, while Chandler provides rich detail about the
organizational innovations developed by the railroads, this example does not
prove that one of the great benefits of using the corporate form was that it sup-
ported the development of organizational capital, because this benefit cannot be
separated from the benefit of committed financial capital to support extensive
and highly specialized physical capital.
But the story of the rise of the Singer Sewing Machine Company pro-
vides an example in which the corporate form was used-not to raise financial
capital, nor to achieve the benefits of limited liability-but to lock in existing
capital, to provide a mechanism for settling any subsequent disputes among the
leading participants in the firm, and ultimately to support the development of a
massive marketing organization. The I. M. Singer & Company began in 1851,
when Isaac Merritt Singer got his first patent on a machine that would make
a continuous series of stitches.2 2 Singer was not an engineer or mechanic by
training-indeed, he had spent most of his early adulthood attempting to be an
actor.2 3 But while he never achieved much success as an actor, during one
spell of unemployment, in 1839, he had taken a job as a laborer in Chicago,
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 79-121.
222. RuTH BRANDoN, A CAPITALIST ROMANCE: SINGER AND THE SEWING MACHINE 85 (1977).
223. Id. at 16-32.
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apparently working on construction of the Lockport and Illinois Canal.224 In that
capacity, he invented and patented a machine for drilling rock.22 While he con-
tinued for many years to attempt to make a living as an actor, his knack for
mechanical invention proved more remunerative, and in 1844 he began working
on a machine to carve wooden type for printers. For the next six years, Singer
formed brief partnerships with a few investors, and borrowed money wherever he
could to work on his type-carving machine (which he had completed and pat-
ented by 1849) and to attempt to sell it.226
Despite his efforts, there seemed to be little interest in Singer's type-carving
machine. So Singer, encouraged by his partners at the time, Orson Phelps, who
owned a machine shop in Boston where Singer was working on his design, and
George Zeiber, who was providing financing for the type-carving effort, shifted
his attention to the idea of developing a sewing machine.222 In 1845, Elias Howe
had invented a machine that would sew stitches, but it was clumsy and difficult
to use for a number of reasons."2 By 1850, a number of other inventors had also
developed crude sewing machines, but all were clumsy and none worked par-
ticularly well. Phelps showed Singer one of the early machines and urged him
to attempt to improve upon it."' Singer immediately envisioned a machine in
which a straight needle carrying one thread moved up and down, and a shuttle
working below the needle would move a second thread back and forth. Zeiber
put up additional financial capital, and by late 1850, Singer had a working
model, the basic design of which would eventually become the basis for all
modem sewing machines. The partnership agreement among the three men
called for the resulting patent to be the "equal property of the three partners.""23
During the next year, the three partners attempted to work out problems in
the design that caused the early machines to break down frequently, to develop a
method of manufacturing the machines in quantity, and to build a market for
them. Using his well-developed skills as a dramatist, Singer went on the road to
show the machine at fairs and exhibits.23' Meanwhile, the partners were
perpetually low on money, borrowing from friends and family to buy materials
and to pay the wages of workmen in the machine shop building models.232 They
224. Id. at 24.
225. Id. at 25.
226. Id. at 36-48.
227. Id. at 43-44.
228. Id. at 62.
229. Id. at 44.
230. Id. at 47. The partnership operated under the name of "Singer and Phelps," however, and
Singer apparently bullied both Phelps and Zeiber into letting him apply for the patent in only his own
name. Id. at 74. Singer's first sewing machine patent was obtained in 1851. Id. at 85.
231. Id. at 73.
232. Id. at 76.
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also had to fight continuous legal battles over patent rights.233 And they feuded
among themselves. After obtaining the first significant order (for thirty
machines at $100 each), Singer took the proceeds and pushed through a deal




Phelps was immediately replaced by another partner, Barzillan Ransom, who put
$10,000 into the business in exchange for a one-third interest.235 Ransom too
proved to be an inappropriate partner, and within a year, Singer had bullied him
out of his share in exchange for forty sewing machines.236 Singer was subse-
quently to squeeze Zeiber out of his share of the business too through his blatantly
bullying behavior.237 Hence we see Singer engaging in exactly the kind of hold-
up behavior that the team production theory predicts can plague working rela-
tionships in complex production activities. In every instance, although his
partners had contributed financing, mechanical know-how, manufacturing space,
equipment, and sales and general business capabilities, Singer provided two
critical inputs-the patent rights and the inventors' ability-and used his control
over those inputs repeatedly to hold up his partners and squeeze them out of
agreed-upon shares of the proceeds of the business.
In 1851, Singer again took on another partner, this time one who was his
equal in shrewdness, and who could stand up to his bullying behavior. Edward
Clark was a lawyer, and was granted a one-third share in the business in
exchange for supplying legal services, especially in the ongoing patent battles.238
Clark pushed through Singer's patent application, and once granted, arranged for
the rights to the patent to be divided equally between himself and Singer.
239
Clark and Singer then bought out Zeiber's interest in the firm for $6000.24 0 Clark
and Singer became the only partners in I. M. Singer & Company.
During the next ten years, the market for sewing machines grew, slowly at
first. Building a market for sewing machines was difficult because the machines
represented a very substantial investment relative to typical levels of household
wealth and income.24' Moreover the product was at first seen as something that
had no purpose other than to save time for women, women were viewed as
unlikely to be able to operate such a mechanical device, and in any case,
233. The firm had to defend against patent challenges by Howe, whose earlier machine had been
the first to use two threads to produced a lock-stitch. Id. at 95. The partners also had to challenge other
manufacturers who were copying Singer's design without a license. Id. at 96-97.
234. The first $1000 was to be paid immediately and $3000 more to be paid in installments. Id.
at 79.
235. Id. at 79-80.
236. Id. at 81.
237. Id. at 82-84.
238. Id. at 82.
239. Id. at 81, 85.
240. Id. at 85-86.
241. Id. at 116.
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"respectable" women would probably not choose to use a complex mechanical
device. 42 Moreover, the legal feuding among holders of various sewing machine
patents became increasingly intense, costing I. M. Singer & Company most of
their profits, and virtually all of Clark's time and energies during the years from
1851 to 1856.243 In the fall of that year, the three leading manufacturers, together
with Elias Howe, who among them held dozens of patents on sewing machines
and their various improvements-including all of the most important
patents-agreed to form the first "patent pool." '244 The parties contributed all of
their relevant patents to a single pool, and agreed that, for a fee of $15 per
sewing machine sold, they could all use each others' patents.4 Part of this fee
was set aside for fighting future patent infringement battles against any other
manufacturers who might attempt to use the devices covered by patents in the
pool, and the rest would be divided among the three manufacturing firms in the
pool.246 An additional fee of $5 per machine was to go to Howe, who held that
key early patent and had won a series of court battles defending his claim.242
With the patent wars settled, I. M. Singer & Company manufactured and
sold 2564 machines in 1856, and by 1860, production and sales reached 13,000
machines. Singer and Clark were rapidly becoming wealthy, and though still
organized as a conventional partnership, were beginning to build a substantial
manufacturing, distribution, and sales organization. They had established sales
offices in many major U.S. cities, as well as in Paris, Glasgow, and Rio de Janeiro,
and were even thinking about establishing manufacturing operations overseas.248
Singer and Clark, though they didn't particularly like or trust each other, had
managed to establish a reasonably successful working relationship.
Meanwhile, however, Singer was thoroughly enjoying his new wealth,
and was living an unusually flamboyant life. In 1860, a series of incidents
brought public attention to the fact that Singer had domestic relationships
with, and numerous children by, four different women, only one of whom he
was legally married to.249 To escape the wrath of the woman with whom he had
been living the longest and the most openly, who called herself Mrs. Isaac Singer,
and with whom he had fathered eight children, Singer fled to England. 20 There
242. Id. at 120-22.
243. Id. at 89. Brandon reports that newspapers of the period carried regular reports on the latest
developments in the "Sewing Machine War." Id.
244. Id. at 97-98.
245. Id. at 98.
246. Id.
247. Id. The fee to Howe was $6 per machine if the machine was sold abroad.
248. Id. at 135-36.
249. Id. at 163-64.
250. Id. at 162-63. This woman was Mary Ann Sponsler, who had been Singer's most frequent and
public companion for nearly twenty years, despite the fact that Singer had never been legally divorced from
Catherine Haley Singer, with whom he had fathered two children.
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he promptly became involved with a fifth woman, whom he eventually did marry
once his divorce from his first wife was finalized.
25'
Apart from the unseemliness and notoriety of this lifestyle (which might
have had a negative impact on the ability of the firm to market Singer machines
to "respectable" households) why did this matter to Clark? The problem, Clark
could easily foresee, was that if the firm were still organized as a partnership at the
point at which Singer died, the valuable business that the two of them had built
over the previous years would be destroyed in the legal battles over claims to
Singer's estate.252 Singer's heirs, however many of them there might be, would all
have some legal claim to some share of the business, and it would probably
require years of court battles to establish who was to get what. Clark feared that
without liquidating much of the firm, he would not be able to come up with
enough cash to prevent catastrophe by buying out Singer's share from the heirs.
Clark realized that the solution to this problem was to incorporate the
business and to ease Singer out of active management.253 By the 1860s, the
corporate form was becoming much more widely used by manufacturing firms, 54
so Clark would understand that once incorporated, the business assets would no
longer be the joint property of Clark and Singer, but would belong to the
corporation. Equity shares would be issued to Clark and Singer, each of which
would provide a pro rata claim on any distributions from the business. But any
such distribution would be at the discretion of a board of directors of the
company, and could not be compelled by either former partner, nor by the
executor of the estate, nor would it likely be compelled by any court of law
handling the proceedings. Heirs could be given equity shares in the business out
of Singer's estate without disturbing or breaking up the assets and governance
structure of the business.
By this time, the company had no need to raise additional capital, as it was
generating cash faster than it could reinvest it. Nor were there any particular
concerns about limiting the liability of shareholders: The firm had little or no
debt (except perhaps small amounts of trade credit from materials suppliers), and
class action lawsuits for fingers injured by sewing machine thread guides and
presser feet had not yet been invented. The only function that incorporation
served was to ensure that the substantial organizational capital that had been
accumulated by the firm could not be tom apart, nor could its reputation be
easily destroyed, as a result of the messy personal affairs of one of the partners.
251. Id. at 174-75.
252. Id. at 177.
253. Id. at 178.
254. Hamill, supra note 145, at 101-02 nn.85-86 (identifying twenty-three states that passed general
incorporation statutes between 1836 and 1859).
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According to Singer's biographer, it took three more years for Clark to get
Singer to agree to incorporation of the business, but in August of 1863, 1. M.
Singer & Company was dissolved, and the business was reorganized as the Singer
Manufacturing Company. 5' The firm by then had twenty-two patents and
capital assets of $550,000. Within four years after incorporation, it had estab-
lished manufacturing and sales operations overseas, becoming the first American
firm to produce and market extensively in Europe.5 6 According to Chandler,
Singer was also the first manufacturing company to establish a sales force of its
own salaried employees, rather than relying on sales agents.257 The Singer organi-
zation that developed in the 1860s and 1870s included retail branch offices in
virtually every community in the United States of at least 5000 in population
(as well as in many communities in Europe and South America). Each branch
office included, at a minimum, a general salesman, an instructor (often a female
employee hired to teach other women how to use the machines), a mechanic (to
assure customers that machines could be promptly repaired if they broke down),
and a bookkeeper.258
One other detail of the transition from parmership to corporation suggests
that the governance structure established in the newly organized corporation was
designed to serve a mediating function, as the team production theory suggests,
rather than to act as an agent of shareholders, as the standard principal-agent
theory of the corporation argues. Ruth Brandon writes:
Singer had only agreed to the end of the partnership [in which he knew he
would lose his ability to "hold up" the other participants] under certain
conditions, the principal one being that neither of the partners would be
president of the new company while the other was alive, and that both
would 'retire from active participation in the management of the business.'
In other words.... if Singer was to become a non-executive director, then
so must Clark. If he [Clark] was so determined to dissociate Singer from
the business, this was the price he had to pay.259
The agreement they ultimately reached was that Singer and Clark would
each take 40 percent of the shares of the new company in exchange for their
interests in the partnership, with the rest to be subscribed to by four senior
officers of the firm (who were each required to buy 175 shares at $200 per
share), and twelve other employees of the company who were offered the
opportunity to buy shares.26 A young manager, Mr. Inslee Hopper, was
255. BRANIXN, supra note 222, at 179.
256. See Robert B. Davies, "Peacefully Working to Conquer the World": The Singer Manufacturing
Company in Foreign Markets, 1854-1889, 43 Bus. HisT. REV. 299, 299 (1969).
257. VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 303-04.
258. Id. at 403.
259. BRANDON, supra note 222, at 179.
260. Id. at 180, 182.
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named president.26 The initial board of trustees would include Singer,
Clark, Hopper, George Ross McKenzie (a trusted agent of the firm for a
number of years), William Proctor, and Alexander Sterling.
262
While Singer retired from active involvement in the company after that,
Clark did not, becoming president after Singer died in 1875.263 Chandler gives
Clark and McKenzie credit for building an integrated organizational structure
that became a model for many other large manufacturing and distribution
companies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2M
Although the anecdotal evidence provided by this story does not prove
that the corporate form was necessary for creating such an organization, it lends
considerable support to the idea. Once the firm was incorporated, it could
make more credible commitments to outsiders and to new participants as the
firm drew them into the business. 6' The corporation itself could become the
repository of "reputational" assets-the intangible qualities that third parties
rely on in choosing to deal with any business in which long-term commitments
or nonobvious quality issues might be important. Reputational assets of a cor-
poration are much less dependent on the ability of any individual participant to
deliver personally on his or her implicit or explicit promises than comparable
assets of a partnership would be. Thus the existence of an established corpora-
tion may reassure anyone who might consider engaging in a short- or long-term
productive relationship with members of the team. If the manager of the com-
pany factory tries to arrange a long-term supply contract with an iron and steel
mill owner, for example, the mill owner can be reassured that the assets of the
whole business are backing the commitments made under the contract.
Similarly, if a sales agent promises customers that Singer will provide ongoing
service for the machines it sells,266 the customers can be reassured that, if
261. Id. at 180.
262. Minutes of First Meeting of Board of Trustees of Singer Manufacturing Co. (June 6, 1863)
(on file with the Wisconsin Historical Society).
263. BRANDON, supra note 222, at 193; VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 403.
264. VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 403-14.
265. Nicholas S. Argyres & Julia Porter Liebeskind, Contractual Commitments, Bargaining
Power, and Governance Inseparability: Incorporating History into Transaction Cost Theory of the Firm
8 (Nov. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting that the corporate form, unlike
other business forms available historically, bound shareholders as a group to the corporation, making it
nearly impossible for them to withdraw their capital, and that "[this in turn protected the interests of
buyers and suppliers who otherwise would be unwilling to enter into long-lived relationships with the
firm that might put their own wealth at risk").
266. Singer was among the first small machine companies to promise customers ongoing after-
sales service (as well as some initial training in using the machines), and to establish a network of sales
and service branch offices to carry out these activities.
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something happens to that agent, someone else in the company will fulfill these
promises."'
For similar reasons, corporate status may have been critical for the suc-
cessful marketing of branded consumer products. It appears, for example, that
Procter & Gamble-founded as a parmership in 1837 to make and sell soaps and
candles--converted from a partnership to a corporation in the early 1880s, very
shortly after it invented and began advertising and selling Ivory soap, one of the
first soap products to be branded and marketed nationally.2 68 A business that
operates through the corporate form may hence be able to reduce the perceived
risks involved for outsiders who might have to make idiosyncratic investments to
deal with the business. Ordinary business risks do not disappear (although the
larger the corporation becomes, the more it might be able to withstand some
fluctuations in business activity), but risks that a customer would be harmed by
the opportunistic behavior of one participant in the enterprise are probably
greatly mitigated.
B. But Was Incorporation Really Necessary?
While numerous manufacturing, transportation, distribution, and mar-
keting firms were incorporated in the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s, there are also
notable examples of firms that grew to be very large and powerful in the nine-
teenth century without incorporation. If incorporation was so important to accu-
mulating organizational assets, how was it that such firms could grow so large
without incorporation? E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Company, for example,
operated for nearly a century, from its beginnings as a small gunpowder
manufacturer on the banks of the Brandywine River to one of the world's largest
manufacturers of explosives in the 1890s. It managed to do this because a
succession of talented sons, nephews, and grandsons of E. I. du Pont were able to
keep the business going. The du Pont family kept their wealth invested in the
business, the family name served as the repository of reputational capital, and
relationships among the participants in the business were governed by familial
ties that made trust possible.
In 1889, however, "General" Henry du Pont, who had ruled over the
gunpowder empire with an iron fist, died, leaving control to Henry's nephew
Eugene du Pont (son of Alexis du Pont), who also believed in tight control of the
firm, and shared little power with the next generation. In 1899, the firm was
267. VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 404 (discussing decisions made by senior Singer executives in
1879 to provide "a 'second man' to each of the foreign agencies 'so that neither sickness, death, nor any
other circumstances may interfere with the smooth working of the business to any great extent").
268. PROCTOR & GAMBLE, P&G HISTORY 1837-1889, at http://www.pg.com/aboutpg/
overview-facts/history.jhtml.
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incorporated in the State of Delaware, but the act of incorporation appears to
have been a technicality, with all the stock held by those family members who
had been partners.269 Henry A. du Pont, a cousin of Eugene's, had pushed for
incorporation as a mechanism to weaken the control that Henry had as
president and sole executive officer of the partnership. According to Delaware
law at the time, the newly formed corporation would need a set of officers,
which Henry hoped would help to distribute control rights.27 But Eugene only
agreed to incorporation on the grounds that he would still be president, and he
continued to be unwilling to delegate authority. When Eugene died in 1902,
the elder members of the clan feared that none of the younger members had the
appropriate qualifications to run the company and that they might dissipate the
wealth if they took over the management.27" ' So they decided that the best thing
to do was to sell their interests in the firm to Laflin & Rand, a major competitor.
But, at a shareholders' meeting called to approve a formal resolution to sell the
company, three cousins, Pierre, Alfred, and Coleman stepped forward to ask if
they could buy the company from the senior du Ponts.272 The junior members of
the clan bought out the position of the senior members for notes worth $12
million and 28 percent of the common stock in the newly reorganized firm.273
Pierre, Alfred, and Coleman then reincorporated in 1903 in New Jersey (whose
corporate law by then permitted corporations to own the stock of other corpora-
tions), 74 consolidated all the various firms in the du Pont empire into a single
firm,27 reorganized the company to establish an executive committee, and estab-
lished a fifteen member board of directors, consisting of Pierre, Coleman, Alfred,
and the four other members of the executive committee, three members of the
elder generation, and five directors who were minority shareholders.276
Andrew Carnegie also managed to build a sizeable business organization
(Carnegie Steel and various related companies such as the Frick Coke Company)
without the benefits of incorporation. But he did so by retaining very tight per-
sonal control over the managerial structure of the organization, choosing
employees and partners carefully,277 and squeezing out partners who did not suit
269. JOSEPH FRAZIER WALL, ALFRED I. DU PONT: THE MAN AND His FAMILY 173-74 (1990).
270. Id. at 174.
271. GERARD COLBY, DU PONT DYNASTY 132 (1984).
272. VISIBLE HAND, supra note 16, at 50.
273. COLBY, supra note 271, at 136.
274. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR. & STEPHEN SALSBURY, PIERRE S. DU PONT AND THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN CORPORATION 89 (1971).
275. Id. at 78.
276. Id. at90.
277. See, e.g., HAROLD C. LIVESAY, ANDREW CARNEGIE AND THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS 111
(Oscar Handlin ed., 2000) (quoting Carnegie as saying "Mr. Morgan buys his partners, I raise my own").
Livesay reports that Carnegie employed a systematic analysis to evaluate his men's performance, and that
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him."8 He also had what came to be called the "Iron Clad Agreement" consist-
ing of three provisions in the partnership agreement: First, if a partner died, the
remaining partners had a right to buy out the deceased partner's share of the
business at book value, and had an extended period of time to pay for this
share. Second, by a vote of partners holding two-thirds of the value of the firm,
any partner could, at any time, be required to sell out his position at book
value.279 Carnegie controlled 58 percent of the value of the firm, so he could not
be expelled under this provision, and no other partner could be expelled without
his consent. In practice, if he wanted somebody out, they were out. Third, a
partner could retire at any time, but if he wanted to sell out, he had to accept
book value for his share, and collect the amount in installments over time."8
Thus Carnegie was effectively able to keep capital locked into the firm from
the time he first entered the steel business, in 1872, until the late 1890s, when he
got into a feud with one of his partners and senior officers, Henry Frick. Frick
and another partner Henry Phipps decided that they wanted to cash out, but
because the book value of the firm was so much lower than they believed the
market value of the firm to be, they solicited a buyer for the whole business, to
cash all of them out.28' The deal fell through, and Carnegie attempted to oust
Frick under Article 2 of the Iron Clad Agreement. Frick, who was still in charge
of the Coke Company part of the business, retaliated by overcharging Carnegie
for coke, and suing for a revaluation of the firm's assets. The result was an ugly
court battle in which the inner workings of the organization were revealed to the
public.282  When the two finally settled, they created a new incorporated
company in 1900, the Carnegie Company, to serve as a holding company con-
trolling both Carnegie Steel and Frick Coke.283 Carnegie held about 54.5 percent
of the stock.8
So we see that partnership worked for a while, as long as all the partners
were getting along well enough. But partnership is not as well suited to working
out serious disputes among team members as corporations are, either because
he kept detailed records on who produced the best results. Those that did were promoted. More than forty
men thus rose through the ranks to become partners at one point or another. Id. at 112.
278. Id. at 165. Carnegie reportedly forced out some fifteen partners at various times before the
company incorporated.
279. "Book value" of assets reflects the purchase price paid for them, minus any depreciation charges
against them. In a successful going concern, the book value of the business is often much lower than the
market value of the business, because the book value does not reflect any of the value of organizational
assets, relationships, reputation, and other aspects of the going concern value of the business.
280. LIVESAY, supra note 277, at 189; see also 1 WILLIAM T. HOGAN, S. J., EONOMIC HISTORY OF
THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 250 (1971).
281. LIVESAY, supra note 277, at 188-94.
282. Id. at 199.
283. Id. at 198-99; see also HOGAN, supra note 280, at 250.
284. LIVESAY, supra note 277, at 199.
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partners can threaten to leave and take their capital with them, or they can cause
trouble if they agree to lock in their capital (as the Carnegie partners did), and
then find that when they become unhappy they cannot get out easily.
Finally, consider another example that at first impression seems to contra-
dict the thesis that incorporation was necessary to lock in capital and create a
governance structure that could mediate disputes among business participants
to keep large productive teams together. The Baldwin Locomotive Works of
Philadelphia was the largest builder of locomotives in the United States and
one of the largest in the world throughout the second half of the nineteenth
century. It resisted incorporation and operated as an individual proprietorship
or partnership from its founding in 1831 by Matthias Baldwin, until 1909, near
what turned out to be the peak period of production and profitability.28
Business historian John Brown argues that Baldwin was able to function for
so long in partnership form for a variety of reasons. First, Baldwin never mass-
produced locomotives. Each machine was custom designed to meet the specific
needs of the railroad that ordered it. This meant that the machines were built by
skilled craftsmen using general purpose tools'--so that there may have been less
firm-specific capital at risk despite the fact that the enterprise as a whole used
substantial physical capital. Matthias Baldwin and his successors organized this
work force with a very flat, nonhierarchical organizational structure. Around
1850, for example, the entire firm consisted of four senior managers plus seven
foremen.287 The foremen acted as "inside contractors," meaning that the skilled
craftsmen who actually assembled the machines were the contract employees of
the foreman of the particular shop where they worked (for example, the boiler,
the foundry, smith shops, and the final assembly house), and workers were paid
by the piece.288
For partners, Baldwin carefully selected men who had worked in the organi-
zation and were committed to the idea that the owners should work in the
business, and that layers of overseers were a waste of money.8 9 Baldwin's suc-
cessors did the same. For them, the partnership form was valued "precisely
285. See JOHN K. BROWN, THE BALDWIN LOCOMOTIVE WORKS, 1831-1915, at 97 tbl.4-1
(1995) (listing the series of partnerships that controlled the business until it incorporated). Appendix B
reports capitalization, workforce size, output and other information about Baldwin and its principal
competitors for 1850, 1860, 1870, and 1880. Id. at 243-44. Baldwin's output peaked in 1906 at 2,666
locomotives. Id. at 215. A recession in 1907 caused demand to fall, and from 1907 to 1917, profits fell at
the nation's railroads as a result of rate regulation under the Hepburn Act of 1906. Id. at 224. Locomotive
output at Baldwin never again reached the peak it had hit in 1906. Id. at 223-33.
286. Id. at xxix. The actual processes of innovation, design, and custom building of the locomotives
is discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 6.
287. Id. at 17.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 93-95.
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because of the managerial continuity that private ownership allowed.""29
Although the locomotive business was extremely cyclical, the firm was not ver-
tically integrated, and thus its suppliers and employees bore much of the cyclical
risk along with the firm. 9' Matthias Baldwin took in a partner, Stephen Vail, in
1839, in return for an infusion of $20,000 in capital. That same year, he took in
another partner (so that each had a one-third interest) in exchange solely for
his management expertise, so that Baldwin himself could devote his energies to
designing a new, more powerful, but more flexible locomotive.292 In 1842, he
took on another partner, Asa Whitney, to buy out Vail's interest, 293 and from
then on, the firm was able to continuously reinvest its profits to finance
expansion, and never had to take on a partner to bring in financial capital.9
After Baldwin died in 1866, his successors adopted the same philosophy. Such
was the continuity, that, although at various times fourteen other men were
involved, the active participation of three men as partners, Baldwin from 1831 to
1866, Matthew Baird from 1854 to 1873, and George Burnham from 1867 to
1909, spanned the seventy-eight years from the founding of the company until its
295incorporation.
The firm provided for lock-in of the capital investment by including terms
in the partnership agreement that provided for continuity when a partner 
died. 96
Noting that "the chief threat to managerial stability came in the aftermath of
a partner's death, since surviving partners had to pay off his interest to his
heirs, 292 Brown tells us that the partnership agreement stipulated that the
interest of a deceased partner would 'be drawn out so easily and slowly that
there is no hardship on the survivors [in the firm]. The payment of that estate
is no more onerous than the payment of dividends would be in a corporation. '
In other words, Brown suggests that the lock-in problem was solved by a series of
agreements among successive partners that each would be bought out at death
290. Id. at 96.
291. See id. at 14-15 (detailing how the firm relied on suppliers for financing, and a rudimentary
"just-in-time" inventory management system, and how, when the railroads paid Baldwin in railroad stock,
Baldwin, in turn, paid his suppliers in railroad stock!).
292. Id. at 9-11. Note that, by implication, human capital was considered as important to the busi-
ness as financial capital.
293. Id. at 12.
294. Id. at 99.
295. See id. at 98 chart 4.1.
296. Id. at 26, 98-99.
297. Id. at 98.
298. Id. at 98 (citing J. RUSSELL SMITH, ELEMENTS OF INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 26 (1915)
(quoting Alba Johnson, who was a partner in the firm from 1896 through 1909)). Brown notes that he was
unable to uncover a copy of any actual partnership agreement, so that Johnson's extended remarks in Smith
are a primary source for understanding the terms on which the partnership operated. BROWN, supra note
285, at 98 n.21.
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via a very slow payout plan.2" And the firm apparently managed to avoid major
disputes largely by selecting a very homogeneous group of men, with common
values and beliefs about the organization of work, to become partners.
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS
This Article argues that the popularity of corporate status as a way to organ-
ize production grew out of the unique ability of this legal form in the nineteenth
century to promote and protect the interests not only of shareholders and other
investors, but of a wide range of enterprise participants who made specialized
investments in reliance on the continued existence and financial viability of the
corporation. This ability grew out of the fact that a corporate charter created a
separate legal entity, whose existence and governance were separate from any
of its participants. Entity status and separate governance made it possible to do
something more than engage in a series of business transactions, or relationships,
or even projects. It made it possible to build lasting institutions. Investments
could be made in long-lived and specialized physical assets, in information and
control systems, in specialized knowledge and routines, and in reputation and
relationships, all of which could be sustained even as individual participants in
the enterprise came and went. And these business institutions, in turn, could
accomplish more toward the improvement of the wealth and standard of living of
their participants in the long run than the same individuals could by holding
separate property claims on business assets and engaging in a series of separate
contracts with each other.
The law supported the creation of these entities--even though by the end
of the nineteenth century the power they could wield over the economy had
become a matter of concern-because, according to economic historian Naomi
Lamoreaux, the culture in general was moving away from the individualistic
ideologies on which the country was founded to "[t]he idea that when individuals
combined their skills and energies they created something that was more than
the [sum] of its parts."3 "°
Other mechanisms by which business organizers can commit resources to
business ventures that require institution building may be available today. Cor-
porate form may no longer seem so unique. But understanding the role that
corporate law played in promoting resource commitment and institution building
299. In fact, the incident that finally convinced the partners that they needed to incorporate was the
death in 1909 of William P. Henszey, who held a 20 percent interest in the firm. Although the firm could
have bought out that interest, at the time, George Burnham, who was also a major partner, was 93, and
John Converse was 69, so the firm was afraid that it might soon have to buy out those interests as well.
BROWN, supra note 285, at 216.
300. Lamoreaux, supra note 46, at 69 n.82.
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during the early development of an industrial economy in the United States
could provide insights into a number of issues of contemporary concern.
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